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ABSTRACT
VARIABLES IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
FEBRUARY 2006
MEREDITH LIZABETH LANDMAN
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Barbara H. Partee

A central goal of generative linguistics is to determine what constitutes a possible grammar of a natural language. This thesis works toward that goal in positing a constraint on
the possible semantic types of variables in natural language. Specifically, I argue here
that the logical forms (LFs) of natural languages do not contain higher-type variables,
i.e., variables of a type higher than that of an individual, type e (see Chierchia (1984) and
Baker (2003) for similar proposals). I refer to this constraint as the No Higher-Type Variables constraint (NHTV).
Assuming that the domain of individuals, D, includes at least objects, kinds,
events, event-kinds, degrees, situations, worlds, times, and locations, all of which have
been independently argued to be necessary members of D, what NHTV predicts not to
occur are object language expressions that vary over, e.g., generalized quantifiers, relations, or properties. While NHTV thus predicts a very restricted inventory of variable denoting expressions, I argue that it accounts for a surprisingly wide range of data in characterizing which variable-denoting expressions do and do not occur.
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I motivate NHTV based primarily on data from English, and to a lesser extent,
German and Polish. I focus empirically on two types of expressions that are commonly
analyzed as involving variables: (i) (overt) pro-forms, and (ii) A’-movement gaps. In particular, I look closely at pro-forms and gaps that have the syntactic distribution of items
that are commonly taken to be of a higher-type, namely, APs, AdvPs, VPs, and NPs.
While all of these expressions are commonly taken to denote properties of individuals, I
argue that pro-forms and gaps that have the distribution of these categories should not be
analyzed as property variables, but instead either (i) vary over individuals, or (ii) do not
involve variables at all.
The bulk of the thesis is devoted to backing up NHTV by (i) showing that hypothetical higher-type variables are systematically missing, and (ii) looking closely at potential counterexamples on a case-by-case basis.
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CHAPTER 1
POSSIBLE VARIABLES

1.1 Introduction
A central goal of generative linguistics is to determine what constitutes a possible grammar of a natural language. This thesis works toward that goal in positing a constraint on
the possible semantic types of variables in natural language. Specifically, I will argue
here that the logical forms (LFs) of natural languages do not contain higher-type variables, i.e., variables of a type higher than that of an individual, type e, so that the following constraint holds (see Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003) for similar proposals, as discussed in Section 2 below):

(1)

The No Higher-Type Variables Constraint (NHTV)
Variables in the LFs of natural languages are of type e.

I will motivate NHTV based primarily on data from English, and to a lesser extent German and Polish. I consider it a potential semantic universal, but careful investigation of
unrelated languages will be necessary to test whether it holds cross-linguistically.
To make clear the predictions of NHTV, it is first necessary to make clear both (i)
my assumptions about what counts as an individual, and (ii) what it means to be a variable in the syntactic representation, that is, how variables are represented and interpreted

1

at LF.1 Regarding (i), I take the domain of individuals, De (henceforth, D) to include at
least objects, kinds, events, event-kinds, degrees, situations, worlds, times and locations,
all of which have been independently argued to be necessary members of D (for arguments for construing kinds as individuals, see Carlson 1977b and references therein; for
analyses that assume an ontology that includes degrees, see Klein 1980, 1991, von
Stechow 1984, Heim 1985 among others, based on Cresswell 1976; for events, see Davidson 1967 and others; on event-kinds, see Barwise and Perry 1983, Chierchia 1984,
Hinrichs 1985, Landman and Morzycki 2003; on situations as individuals, see Kratzer
1989; on worlds, see Cresswell 1990 and Percus 2000). Thus, what NHTV predicts not to
occur are object language expressions that vary over, e.g., generalized quantifiers, relations, or properties. With respect to properties, this prediction is complicated by the possibility that certain properties correspond to individuals (Chierchia 1984, Chierchia and
Turner 1988); I address this issue in Section 1.2.1 below.
Regarding (ii), I take object language variables to be those LF objects that receive
their denotation solely from an assignment function. More precisely, I assume here a
framework in which a variable is syntactically represented as (associated with) an index
that receives its semantic value from an assignment function.2 Take, for example, the personal pronoun he, which may be analyzed as a variable as in (2); here, it is associated

1

I will use the phrases “in the syntactic representation”, “at LF”, and “in the object language” interchangeably here.
2

It is an interesting issue how and if this constraint might be formulated in a variable-free semantics (Quine
1960, Cresswell 1990, Jacobson 2002, 2000, 1999). I postpone discussion of this issue to Chapter 4.
2

syntactically with the index i, and receives its denotation from the variable assignment g,
with g mapping i to some particular individual in D.3

(2)

||hei||g = g(i)

In the case of he, the variable intuitively varies over individuals; I will, however,
incorporate NHTV into the semantic component so that all variables range over individuals. That is, I will implement NHTV as a restriction on the variable assignment, by restricting its range to individuals in D, as in (3).

(3)

A variable assignment is a partial function from |N into D.

In effect, object language variables necessarily denote in D.
Having made clear my assumptions about both (i) what counts as an individual,
and (ii) how variables are represented and interpreted at LF, I turn now to the empirical
motivation for NHTV, which is the main topic of this thesis. Before looking at the particular phenomena I will focus on here, however, it will be useful to first reflect on the
question of how it is we know whether a variable occurs in the syntactic representation.
In addressing this issue, I aim to clarify both my reasons for focusing on the particular
data I will look at here, as well as my position towards a certain set of potential counterexamples to NHTV that I will not be looking at in detail, but do not see as fatal for my
constraint.
3

I abstract away here from further information about the PHI features of a pronoun, e.g., masculine gender
on he has been proposed to contribute a presupposition that the value of the variable be male.
3

Arguably, a key point in motivating the presence of a variable in the object language is to show that the alleged variable has bound instances. Consider, for instance, the
debate from the 1970s over whether natural language needs the full expressive power of
quantification over times, which I will briefly summarize here (see Massey 1969, Kamp
1971, Vlach 1973, Partee 1973, Parsons 1973, Stalnaker 1973, van Benthem 1977,
Saarinen 1979, and especially Cresswell 1990 and Kusumoto 1999). In Priorian tense
logic, it had been assumed that a single tense index t was provided as a parameter on the
interpretation function (Prior 1967). Tense operators, making reference to t, were then
responsible for the interpretation of sentences with tense information such as past or future. Work by Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973), however, showed that natural languages
can keep track of time points different from t, and a second parameter on the interpretation function was proposed to store intermediate times. Building on Kamp and Vlach’s
work, it was then shown that in principle an indefinite number of indices would be
needed to account for the expressive power of natural language (Gabbay 1974; Saarinen
1979; Cresswell 1990); this in turn was shown to be equivalent in expressive power to
explicit quantification over times in the object language (Cresswell 1990).4 Importantly, it
was the bound uses of these variables that was most telling about their status in the object
language.
To determine whether a variable occurs in the syntactic representation, then, a
first point is to determine whether the alleged variable has bound instances. The fact
alone that an expression shows some context dependency is not a sufficient reason for
positing a variable: If the expression appears to just have an indexical use, that is, if we

4

The same argument can be made for worlds (Cresswell 1990), and possibly situations (Kratzer 2004).
4

do not find bound instances of that expression, it is entirely possible to represent this information via a separate parameter on the assignment function. A second point is to show
that apparent bound uses are not due to bound situation arguments (as Kratzer 2004
points out). To illustrate this latter point, consider the use of higher-type variables to account for contextual restrictions on quantifier domains (Westerstahl 1984, von Fintel
1994, Stanley and Szabo 2000, Stanley 2002, Martí 2003). Quantifiers are context dependent in that the interpretation of a sentence in which in they occur varies depending
on the context in which they are uttered. For example, consider an utterance of (4) in the
context of a family at the dinner table (based on an example from von Fintel 1998):

(4)

Everyone is so quiet.

Under a natural reading of this sentence, the universal quantifier does not quantify over
all individuals in the world, but rather is taken to quantify over all individuals at the table;
that is, the domain of quantification appears to be contextually restricted. This narrowing
of the domain of quantification has been accounted for by positing a higher-type variable
in the syntactic representation, which effects a restriction on the domain of the quantifier
(there are several proposals for how to implement this idea, see references above). We
may ask, then: Do these variables show bound instances? There are indeed examples in
which these variables appear to co-vary with a higher quantifier (von Fintel 1994, Heim
1991), as (5) illustrates (from Kratzer 2004):

(5)

Every girl finished every task (she was supposed to do.)

5

In (5), the universal quantifier in the second DP, every task, seems to quantify over the
set of tasks specific to each girl. This thus appears to be a bound use of the domain restriction variable on the second quantifier. However, as Kratzer (2004) points out, these
readings can be accounted for by a bound variable reading of an independently motivated
– and syntactically represented – situation variable (the reader is referred to that work for
further specifics of that account). Kratzer in addition presents some independent problems for the higher-type variable approach to domain restrictions, questioning, for instance, why these variables are covert across languages.5 I will not look further at the use
of covert higher-type variables to account for context dependencies, but hope to have
made clear that it is a challenge for such accounts to show that the alleged variables have
bound instances, and that these instances cannot be accounted for by bound situation
variables, which are independently motivated. I thus do not seem them as necessarily presenting counterexamples to my claim.
I turn now to the cases I will focus on in this thesis. In search of higher-type variables, I will look at two types of expressions that are commonly analyzed as involving
variables: (i) (overt) pro-forms, and (ii) movement gaps. In particular, I will look for proforms and gaps that have the syntactic distribution of items that are commonly taken to
be of a higher-type.6 Consider, for instance, the following candidate higher-type proforms in English, which have the distribution of adjectival phrases (APs), adverbial

5

See also Carlson and Storto, to appear, who question the use of these higher-type variables to account for
contextual dependencies, but propose a very different alternative account of the same phenomena.
6

This is, at least, my starting strategy in searching for higher-type variables. However, as will become clear
in looking at specific phenomena below, surface pro-forms and traces are not always in a one-to-one correspondence with variables at LF. For example, the surface trace of a pied-piped constituent may at LF contain more semantic material than just a variable; the surface trace then at LF may be of a higher-type, while
the variable it contains is just an individual. I will discuss this issue explicitly when it arises below.
6

phrases (AdvPs), verb phrases (VPs), and noun phrases (NPs, assuming the DP hypothesis), respectively:7

(6)

Those littlei cars look good, but few suchi cars are safe.

AP

(7)

You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and haughtinessi, and
if danced soi/thusi, the dance will be beautiful.8

AdvP

(8)

Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does soi too.

VP

(9)

I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi. AP

(10)

I’ll wash the big dishesi, if you’ll wash the little onesi.

NP

While each of these expressions (the latter underlined expression in each of the above)
has the syntactic distribution of a higher-type expression, I will argue that a close look at
their semantics shows that they do not behave like property-variables. Rather, they fall
into two types: they either (i) vary over individuals, or (ii) do not involve variables at all.9
The cases in (6)-(9) – such, thus, do so, and so – are instances of the first type:
Each of these expressions, I will argue, is associated at LF with a variable that ranges

7

I set aside for the immediate discussion instances of VP and NP ellipsis, for example, alongside (8) and
(10) are (i) and (ii) below (I use Ø to represent ellipsis):
(i)
(ii)

Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does Øi too.
I’ll wash these dishesi, if you’ll wash those Øi.

VP
NP

I will address this issue directly in Chapter 3, where I will argue (as others have) that at least these cases of
ellipsis are not interpreted as higher-type variables, but rather are represented at LF as having fully articulated internal syntactic structure.
8

From: http://www.cluich.net/HDsolowomen.htm.

9

In the case of one(s)-anaphora, I will not have a strong case against a property-variable, but will only be
able to show that a property-variable analysis is not necessary. Thus, at its weakest, my claim will be that
there are no natural language expressions that necessitate the use of higher-type variables in the object language.
7

over individuals. More specifically, building on Carlson (1977b), I will argue that such
varies over individuals that are either kinds or individuals that instantiate kinds. Such thus
does not vary over properties, as Siegel (1994) proposes. I will show that treating such in
this way accounts for its behavior with respect to its complement clauses and ellipsis.
Further, this account of such explains its parallel behavior with its colloquial paraphrase,
like that, as well as its similarities with degree morphemes such as that and –so as used,
in e.g., that tall or so tall. In the spirit of Landman and Morzycki (2003), I will then extend this analysis of such to thus (7), do so (8), and so (9), arguing that these too do not
vary over properties, but instead vary over individuals that either are kinds or instantiate
kinds.
The case in (10), so-called one(s)-anaphora (Ross 1967, Stockwell, Schachter and
Partee 1973, Jackendoff 1977, Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981, among others), I will treat
as an instance of the second type: following Llombart-Huesca (2002), I will analyze
one(s)-anaphora as an instance of NP Ellipsis.10 Further, I will follow those researchers
that have argued that at least this case of ellipsis is syntactically articulated at LF, and
thus not interpreted as a higher-type variable (see Chapter 3 for references and detailed
discussion of ellipsis.)
NHTV also predicts a restricted typology of movement constructions that at LF
produce variable-binding structures (i.e., those that necessarily involve variables).11 I will
argue that if we look at the kinds of variables that may be abstracted over at LF, the same

10

Alternatively, it may be the case that one(s)-anaphora is purely indexical, as it does not appear to have
bound instances. See Section 3.3 for discussion of this point.
11

Again, I will briefly discuss variable-free frameworks, which do not posit binding of variables as a product of movement, in Chapter 4.
8

restrictions seem to hold as were observed for pro-forms. Consider, for example, the
types of wh-movement possible in English. I assume that these phenomena are represented by structures in which a wh-phrase moves to the Specifier of CP, and binds a variable in the trace position, as illustrated in (11a-b): (11a) is a wh-question, and (11b) a restrictive relative clause, and both can be taken to involve abstraction over an individual in
the position corresponding to the displaced DP.12

(11)

a. Whati did Mary make ti?
b. I liked the movie [CP whi that Mary made ti].

Neither of these constructions (wh-questions nor restrictive clauses), I will argue, ever
create structures in which there is abstraction over higher-type variables. For instance,
there is no wh-word in English that has the distribution of a VP, as (12a) shows.13 Instead,
to form wh-questions for VPs, what appears to be a nominal wh-phrase combines with
main verb do (Ross 1972), as (12b) shows. Similarly, restrictive clauses with VP gaps do
not occur, as (12c) shows (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of what such
clauses might mean, if they were possible, and where syntactically we might expect them
to occur; and see also Baker (2003) for similar examples, as discussed in Section 1.2.2.2
below):

12

As mentioned above, for the cases of reconstruction (or pied-piping), the variable posited at LF will not
directly correspond to the surface gap.
13

I will make similar arguments for APs in Chapter 4.
9

(12)

a. *Whati did you make Mary ti?

(Cf. I made Mary [VP type].)

b. Whati did you make Mary do ti?
c. *I made Mary type [CP whi that you made her ti ].

The absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with VP gaps is expected given
NHTV, since these constructions would require abstraction over VP meanings, usually
taken to be properties of individuals. Note that the ungrammaticality of (12a) is not obviously due to an alternative restriction that only syntactically nominal expressions may
wh-move, as the wh-words where, when, and how in the wh-questions in (13) and restrictive clauses in (14) are not obviously nominal, and yet are well-formed:

(13)

a. Wherei did you put the keys ti?
b. Wheni did you arrive ti?
c. Howi did you travel ti?

(14)

a. Matthew works [CP wherei you work ti ].
b. Matthew laughs [CP wheni you laugh ti ].
c. Matthew sings [CP howi you sing ti ].

I will argue in Chapter 4 that wh-movement of these particular adverbials is possible because they produce structures in which there is abstraction over individuals: locations in

10

(13a) and (14a), times in (13b) and (14b), and event-kinds (following Landman and
Morzycki 2003) in (13c) and (14c).14
Further, there are structures in which VPs do appear to move, as the following
fronting (or topicalization) structure illustrates:

(15)

… and [VP won the election], Mary did __.

However, in just these fronting structures (as well as certain other movement structures,
as discussed in Chapter 4), these phrases have been argued to syntactically occupy their
unmoved position at LF, that is, they have been argued to syntactically reconstruct, based
on their behavior with respect to Principle C (Cinque 1984; Barss 1986, 1988; Huang
1993; Lebeaux 1990, Heycock 1995, Frampton 1999; Romero 1990, Fox 1999, among
others). I will review the arguments for syntactic reconstruction for these cases in Chapter
4, but note here that obligatory syntactic reconstruction for higher-type phrases would be
expected if higher-type variables were disallowed at LF (as proposed in slightly different
terms in Heycock 1995; see also Fox 1999, p. 171, fn. 41 with respect to how manyquestions, as well as Beck 1996). In this context, I will also review in Chapter 4 an alternative account of reconstruction that uses higher-type variables to interpret a moved
higher-type constituent in its base position, i.e., semantic reconstruction (Rullman 1995,
14

I will look at non-restrictive relatives (Sells 1985, Potts 2002a, 2002b) and as-parentheticals (Potts
2002a, 2002b), which both permit both AP and VP gaps, as (i) and (ii) below illustrate, in Chapter 4.
(i)

a.
b.

She was fond of her boy, which Theobald never was __.
I can make words, which you cannot __.

(Sells 1985)

(ii)

a.
b.

Ali was energized, as his trainer suggested he might be __.
She could see the finish line, as Joan could __ too.

(Potts 2002a,b)

11

Cresti 1995, von Stechow 1991, among others), and more generally review the arguments
for favoring syntactic reconstruction over semantic reconstruction.
To sum up, this thesis posits a constraint on the possible semantic types of variables in the LFs of natural languages, in the form of NHTV. The bulk of the thesis will be
devoted to backing up this claim by (i) showing that hypothetical higher-type variables
are systematically missing, and (ii) looking closely at potential counterexamples on a
case-by-case basis.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I review two
precedents to NHTV, namely, Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003). In Section 1.3, I spell
out my basic theoretical assumptions for this thesis. Section 1.4 summarizes the chapter.
In Chapter 2, I look closely at the syntax and semantics of a set of pro-forms that
have the syntactic distribution of modifiers, in particular, APs and AdvPs. I start with an
analysis of such as varying over individuals, following Carlson (1977b) (Section 2.2),
and extend this analysis to analogous adverbial pro-forms, following Landman and
Morzycki (2003) for German so and Polish tak, as well as to adnominal and adverbial like
that in English (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). I then suggest similar analyses of predicative so
(Section 2.5) and the VP pro-form, do so (Section 2.6). Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
In Chapter 3, I turn to VP and NP Ellipsis, reviewing the arguments against (and
for) treating these cases as involving higher-type variables (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). I also,
following Llombart-Huesca (2002), review and present some arguments for treating
one(s)-anaphora as an instance of ellipsis (Section 3.4), and briefly review the e-type
analysis of pronouns as involving deletion (as proposed in Elbourne 2002) (Section 3.5).
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

12

Finally, in Chapter 4, I support my claim that movement does not produce structures in which there is abstraction over higher-type, and that this restricts the types of
movement constructions possible in English. I start by reviewing work on reconstruction
(Section 4.1), to make clear what exactly is abstracted over at LF. I then look closely at
the types of variables that may occur in wh-constructions (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 concludes the chapter and the thesis.

1.2 Precedents
Both Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003) propose constraints similar to NHTV. In the following sections, I will present the main points of each, and try to make clear the ways in
which their proposals differ from my own.

1.2.1 Property Theory and the ‘No Functor Anaphora’ Constraint
The constraint proposed here, NHTV, can be viewed as a stricter version of the ‘no functor anaphora’ constraint of Chierchia (1984). Chierchia’s constraint follows from the
logic of the interpretive system he develops, which permits only variables ranging over
individuals (type e) and predicates (type <e, t>). This has consequences for what variable-denoting expressions are possible in a grammar, as Chierchia points out in the following:
Saying that there are no variables of a certain logical type amounts to saying that we cannot refer to arbitrary entities of that type. On the assumption that anaphoric processes involve a capacity to refer to arbitrary entities in a given domain (formally represented by a
notation with variables ranging over that domain) our system predicts that functors do not
enter anaphoric processes in natural languages. Hence, we should expect that processes
such as pronominalization, VP-deletion, wh-movement etc. never involve determiners,
prepositions, adverbials, etc. It seems to me that there is something basically right about
this generalization. For instance, in general determiners, prepositions, complementizers,
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etc. do not undergo wh-movement and have no pro-forms. Similarly there is no analogue
of VP-deletion or one-anaphora for these items. [Chierchia 1984: pp. 83-84]

The main difference between Chierchia’s constraint and the one I am proposing here is
that his allows for variables of type <e, t>, while mine does not. How, then, might the
two constraints differ in their empirical predictions? There are some difficulties in trying
answer this. In particular, in some interpretation systems (including Chierchia’s) certain
properties correspond systematically to individuals (see the property theory of Chierchia
1984, Chierchia and Turner 1986; see also Cresswell 1973). Under such a system, it
could be hard to tell whether a given occurrence of an expression denotes a property or its
individual correlate, and accordingly, whether a given occurrence of a variable denotes a
property or its individual correlate. However, given that certain properties do not correspond to individuals, one way of comparing the predictions of the two constraints is to try
to test whether just those properties that do not correspond to individuals may bind or corefer with variable-denoting expressions. I will present two cases as arguments that these
properties may not in fact bind variables. To spell this out more precisely, let me at this
point review in more detail the basics of Chierchia’s system.
In Chierchia’s system, properties may be systematically mapped to their individual correlates via a nominalization function, namely, the ‘down’ operator, . Individuals
may likewise be mapped to their corresponding properties via the inverse, predicator
function: the ‘up’ operator, ⌦. The ‘down’ operator nominalizes, while the ‘up’ operator
predicativizes.15 Thus, in this type of system, properties can be looked at from two different points of view:

15

I postpone the formal definition of these operators that I will adopt here until Section 3.2.2 below.
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Qua predicable entities, they appear to be essentially incomplete or “unsaturated” structures. Something like runs cannot stand by itself: it is a structure with a gap in it… So
properties as predicables should be conceived as intrinsically incomplete, “gapped”, or
“functional” structures… Properties, however can be “nominalized” and nominalized
predicative expressions can be subjects in predication acts. This strongly suggests that the
unsaturated structures associated with predicative expressions can somehow be “projected” as individuals, or have individual counterparts, which is what nominalized predicative expressions refer to. So on this view, properties have two modes of being: one as
“intrinsically functional” entities, the other as individuals systematically correlated to
those entities. [Chierchia 1984, pp. 54-55]

Take, for example, the property be nice. Used as a predicate, it can be taken to be of type
<e, t>, mapping an individual to a truth value:

(16)

John is nice.

Used as a subject, however – a gerund, for example – it may be taken to refer to an (abstract) individual, the nominalization of be nice, so that itself may be predicated of an <e,
t> type predicate:

(17)

Being nice is nice.

(Chierchia 1984)

The system offers an elegant account of nominalization, as it makes possible a uniform
treatment of predication: subjects are (generally) individuals, and predicates are (generally) properties. Further, this view of nominalization explains why certain expressions
may not occur as subjects, e.g., I’, as in (18); if I’ necessarily denotes a property, and not
an individual, the ill-formedness of this example follows.

(18)

*Is nice is nice.

(Chierchia 1984)
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Returning to the issue at hand (i.e., whether properties that do not correspond to
individuals may bind variables), a first example comes from I’. If an I’ necessarily corresponds to a property, as (18) suggests, it then follows from NHTV that it should also have
no corresponding pro-form, which appears to be the case, as (19) shows (I use that to represent a hypothetical, but non occurring pro-form):16

(19)

*John is being nicei, and Mary thati too.

This, however, is admittedly not a very strong argument, since independent factors may
certainly rule out pro-forms like the hypothetical that in (19). Further, I’s certainly may
be unpronounced in many languages (e.g., English John is being nice, and Mary too), and
these cases might be analyzed as variables, depending on whether or not there is evidence
for treating them as cases of ellipsis. It would be interesting, though, to see whether any
language uses overt pro-forms for I’.
A second, and stronger example of a class of properties that do not correspond to
individuals, nor bind variables, comes from the nominal domain: Carlson (1977b) observes that certain properties do not seem to have individual correlates, that is, they do
not seem to correspond to kinds. The bare plurals in (20) are a case in point:
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This is admittedly not a very strong argument, since independent factors may certainly rule out pro-forms
like the hypothetical na in (19). Further, I’s certainly may be unpronounced in many languages (e.g., English John is being nice, and Mary too), and these cases might be analyzed as variables, depending on
whether or not there is evidence for treating them as cases of ellipsis. It would be interesting to see whether
any language uses overt pro-forms for I’.
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(20)

a. parts of that machine

(Carlson 1977b)

b. people in the next room
c. books that John lost yesterday
d. bears that are eating (now)

These properties pick out classes of objects that “refer to a finite set of things… that must
exist at a certain time in a given world.” Like I’s, they seem not to be in the domain of
nominalization function, . As Carlson observes, exactly these properties may not antecede the pro-form such, a putative property-anaphor (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed
discussion of such):

(21)

People in the next room… ??such people (are obnoxious) (Carlson 1977b)

Thus, it appears that the antecedents for such form the natural class of properties that
have individual correlates. This falls out naturally from NHTV, and we would not expect
the opposite state of affairs to hold, that is, to find a pro-form that could only be anteceded by properties that do not correspond to kinds/individuals. Again, a constraint like
Chierchia’s, which allows for property variables, would not rule out such pro-forms.
A second strategy for teasing apart the predictions of the two constraints, as stated
in the introduction, is to try to identify syntactic positions that must be occupied by property-denoting expressions (but not their individual correlates), and to check whether proforms or gaps may occupy those positions. I will note, here, however, that it is a problem
for this strategy that even if a particular syntactic node can be assumed to require a prop-
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erty-denoting interpretation, there might still be a syntactic layer below that node which
is individual-denoting, and sister to some covert functional structure which maps individuals to their corresponding predicates. For example, Kratzer (2005), following Krifka
(1995) and Yang (1991) (and, originally, Carlson (1977b)), assumes that noun roots,
stripped of their inflectional morphology, are kind-denoting. She further proposes, in the
spirit of Krifka (1995) and Borer (2005), that English has an ambiguous, non-overt classifier, which may map a kind-denoting noun root into a property of individuals that realize
that kind, as illustrated in (22):

(22)

[NP classifier [N zebra]]

Thus, “predicative count nouns are syntactically constructed from names of kinds with
the help of classifiers” (Kratzer 2005, p. 7). This is relevant here, because even if NPs can
be assumed to be property-denoting, a pro-form or trace with the syntactic distribution of
an NP might itself not necessarily be property-denoting; the pro-form or trace might be
individual-denoting, occupying some lower position in an NP, which is mapped to a
predicate by a covert classifier. With such possibilities for covert functional structure, it
is difficult to determine whether a pro-form is at heart individual-denoting or propertydenoting. I have no good solution for this difficulty at this time, except to keep it in mind
when looking at pro-forms or gaps that have the distribution of higher-type constituents.
In sum, NHTV may be seen as a stricter version of Chierchia’s ‘no functor
anaphora’ constraint, as the latter permits variables ranging over individuals and properties, while the former permits only object language variables ranging over individuals. I
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motivate this stricter constraint based on data that show that properties that do not correspond to individuals may not bind variables, e.g., properties that do not correspond to
kinds may not antecede the pro-form such.

1.2.1.1 The ‘Problem of Adverbs’, and a Solution
It is interesting that Chierchia suggests that only certain adverbs provide a counterexample to the No Functor Anaphora constraint:
Items that might constitute a serious problem for the present hypothesis are obviously adverbs. Adverbs seem to enter various anaphoric processes such as wh-movement or comparative formation, and to have pro-forms (thus, so)…

Chierchia goes on to point out that only three types of adverbials are problematic: manner
adverbials, locatives, and temporal modifiers correspond to pro-forms (thus, there, and
then), while adverbs like again and almost do not. Building on Landman and Morzycki
(2003), I will argue below that this is because it is exactly these three types of adverbials
that correspond to individuals. Specifically, thus, there, and then denote variables eventkinds, locations, and times, respectively.

1.2.2 Baker (2003)
Baker (2003) also proposes a restriction on possible pro-forms and gaps, namely, that
only nouns (and their phrasal projections) can participate in anaphoric relations, that is,
they alone may antecede or occur as pronouns or gaps (for Baker, traces):17
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In Fall 2004, I was excited to find that Mark Baker independently came to similar conclusions about restrictions on pro-forms and traces in his 2003 book, Lexical Categories. It has since been very illuminating
to think about the differences between his constraint and my own.
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I therefore predict that there should be no such thing as “pro-adjectives” or “pro-verbs” in
languages of the world that take part in anaphoric relationships with APs and VPs in the
same way that pronouns enter into anaphoric relationships with NPs. Prima facie, this
seems to be true: virtually every grammar has an index entry for pronouns, but very few
mention pro-adjectives or pro-verbs. It is also perfectly possible to work on a language
like Mohawk or Edo hard for more than five years and never encounter anything one is
tempted to analyze in this way. (Edo is rich in proverbs, but that is another story.) [Baker
2003, p. 129]

Baker’s main interests lie in articulating the core differences among lexical categories;
nouns, he argues, have a unique semantic property that permits them alone to antecede
pronouns and traces. Following Geach (1962) and Gupta (1980), he takes nouns to differ
from all other categories in having a criterion of identity: “the idea in a nutshell is that
only common nouns have a component of meaning that makes it legitimate to ask
whether some X is the same (whatever) as Y…” [Baker, p. 97]. To illustrate this point, he
presents the contrast between the examples in (23) and those in (24), which show that
nouns (whether singular, plural, mass, or abstract) may be used in the frame “X is the
same __ as Y”, while adjectives and verbs (or their phrasal projections) may not (Geach
1962):

(23)

a. That is the same man as you saw yesterday.
b. Those are the same women as we saw last night.
c. That is the same water as was in the cup this morning.
d. We want to have the same liberty as they have.
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(Baker 2003)

(24)

a. #That is the same long as this.

(Baker 2003)

b. #She is the same intelligent as he is.
c. #I saw Julia the same sing as Mary did.
d. #I watched Nicholas the same performs a stunt as Kate performed.

He contends that although the examples in (24) would be ruled out on syntactic grounds,
as only nouns may follow a determiner and adjective, these examples are further “semantically incoherent”, as only nouns have a criterion of identity. Analyzing nouns in this
way, he argues, explains those properties that set them apart from the other lexical categories. In particular, this explains why nouns alone: (i) support individuation and counting (and thus may occur with number marking); (ii) may occur with quantifiers and determiners; (iii) may antecede or occur as pronouns, reflexives and traces; and (iv) may
serve as arguments of predicates. I will restrict the discussion here to the third property of
nouns, i.e., that they alone participate in anaphora. Before looking at Baker’s empirical
arguments for this position, a few comments can be made to compare his proposal to my
own. The differences between the two proposals, I think, are subtle – the two in large part
overlap in predictions – but they do differ. On the empirical side, his constraint predicts
the absence of pro-forms that are syntactically non-nominal, while mine does not, and it
does seem that such expressions do occur (e.g., adverbial thus). On the conceptual side,
our proposals are alike in that they both attribute the potential to participate in anaphora
as being tied to individual-hood, his via the criterion of identity. Our proposals differ,
however, in that I do not assume that individuals are not necessarily linked to nominal
meanings. For example, events – which are commonly used to model verbal meanings –
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can be counted (Krifka 1992, Landman 1996), quantified (Berman, von Fintel 1994 and
others), provide the reference for pro-forms and traces, and may serve as arguments of
predicates (Chierchia 1984 and others). The situation is similar for degrees, which may
also be counted, quantified, provide the reference of a pro-form or trace, and may serve
as arguments of predicates, without necessarily being introduced by nouns. I will try to
illustrate these points more clearly in the next sections by reviewing the empirical evidence presented to support Baker’s view, concentrating here on the predictions his account makes for anaphora and movement.

1.2.2.1 Anaphora
Baker proposes that the fact that nouns have a criterion of identity is represented syntactically by indexing, so that nouns are the only lexical category to bear an index. As a result,
only nouns may antecede pro-forms. He presents (25) and (29) to illustrate this: although
both genitive nominals and nationality adjectives can express the agent in a nominalization, as the examples in (25) show, only the genitive can antecede a pronoun, as the example in (26) shows (Kayne 1984).

(25)

a. Abania’s resistance

(Baker 2003)

b. the Albanian resistance

(26)

a. Albaniai’s destruction of itselfi grieved the expatriate community.
b. *The Albaniani destruction of itselfi grieved the expatriate community.
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These sorts of examples come from Kayne (1984) (as Baker points out) who concluded
from them that adjectives cannot bind pro-forms of a different syntactic category; this
conclusion seems to me plausible here, and would be consistent with my own proposal.
Baker, in contrast, suggests that these examples follow from his theory of nouns, since
nouns alone may bear a referential index. However, to rule out Kayne’s type of explanation, one would want to make sure that there are also no pro-forms which themselves
have the distribution of adjectives and verbs, which Baker does claim to be the case. He
looks in detail at two candidates in English, so, which appears to have the distribution of
a predicate AP (Corver 1997), as (27) shows, and VP Ellipsis, which appears to have the
distribution of a VP, as (28) shows, and argues that neither in fact present counterexamples to his proposal.

(27)

a. Chris is bravei, and Pat seems soi too.

(Baker 2003)

b. I consider Chris intelligenti, and Mary considers Pat soi.

(28)

Chris will solve the problemi, and Pat will Øi too.

(Baker 2003)

So, he argues, is not actually an AP pro-form, as it does not quite have the distribution of
an AP. In particular, unlike APs, so may not occur as a resultative secondary predicate:18
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He also points out that adjectives can be pre-nominal, whereas so cannot, as (i) shows, but it likely that in
these cases so alternates as such (see Chapter 2.)
(i)

*Mary is an intelligent woman, and John is a so man.
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(29)

a. ??John beat the iron flati and Mary beat the copper soi. (Baker 2003)
b. ?*The chair is already cleani, and Chris will wipe the table soi too.

He proposes instead that so functions a pro-PredP, where PredP is a functional projection
that dominates an AP in examples like (29a) and (b) above.19 It is unclear from Baker’s
discussion, however, how PredP would be nominal.
Baker also argues that VP Ellipsis is not a pro-form at all, but instead has internal
syntactic structure. As he points out, although there are parallels between VP Ellipsis and
pronominal anaphora, there is evidence that VP Ellipsis should not be analyzed as a variable over VP meanings. I will take this up again in Chapter 3.
Baker does not look closely at some of the other potential non-nominal pro-forms
mentioned above. Expressions such as adverbial so in English, whose analogue in Polish
(tak), for example, does not inflect as a nominal (Landman and Morzycki 2003; see Section 2.4 below), it seems would be problematic for his proposal, unless these pro-forms
could be argued to be nominal

1.2.2.2 Movement
It follows from Baker’s theory of lexical categories that only NPs should be able to move,
as only they can bind traces. In support of this, he observes that NPs can undergo certain
movement operations that APs and VPs may not. For instance, restrictive relatives (30),
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It is unclear to me that this ‘inverted’ use of so is actually a pro-form, and not something more like the
expression too. The following examples suggest that the inverted so may be compatible with the pro-VP do
so, suggesting that this so is more like too:
(i)

a.
b.

?Chris is protesting, and so is Pat doing so.
Chris is protesting, and Pat is doing so, too.
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clefts (31), and tough-movement (32), he observes, do not allow for gaps corresponding
to APs or VPs (examples based on Baker’s):

(30)

(31)

(32)

Relative Clauses
a. *I am not cleveri that he is ti.

AP

b. *Mary will singi that Pat will ti.

VP

Clefts
a. ??It’s smarti that Chris is ti.

AP

b. *It’s singi that Mary will ti.

VP

Tough-Movement
a. ??Contenti is hard to be ti.

AP

b. *Solve this problemi is hard to make them ti.

VP

In contrast, wh-questions, fronting, and so-called though-movement do seem to permit
AP and VP gaps:

(33)

Wh-Questions
a. How talli is Chris ti?

AP

b. (none)

VP
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(34)

(35)

Fronting
a. …hard-workingi, he is ti.

AP

b. …and clean his roomi he did ti.

VP

Though-Movement
a. Hard-workingi though he is ti…

AP

b. Solve this problemi though he did ti…

VP

Baker proposes explaining this contrast by distinguishing the syntax of these two sets of
wh-constructions: the former involve null operator movement from the gap within the
embedded clause, while the latter are instances of copy movement. In effect, only the
former set of cases necessitate operator-variable binding structures, and since only NPs
bear referential indices, no other category may correspond to the bindee in these structures. In contrast, copy movement, Baker assumes, does not require operator-variable
binding, which is why AP and VP movement is permitted for the latter set of cases.
My own explanation of these facts, as mentioned above, will be quite similar:
those instances of movement that involve variable binding at LF do not permit binding of
higher-type variables; this rules out, e.g., the examples in (30).20 I will, however, assume
that wh-constructions may be analyzed as instances of copy-movement and be semantically interpreted as operator-variable structures (Chomsky 1995, Rullman and Beck 1998,
Sauerland 1998, 2004, Fox 2000). Further, I will assume that examples like (33a) are
cases of pied-piping, and involve reconstruction at LF, so that the variable abstracted

20

I will not look closely at clefts in this thesis, but hope to return to these important cases in future work.
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over for such questions ranges over degrees, construed as individuals, and not AP meanings (presumably, properties of individuals); wh-questions, then, for me, do involve operator-variable binding.
In sum, Baker and I propose similar constraints, which limit the types of proforms and movement constructions expected to occur in natural language. Baker states
his claim syntactically, i.e., no NP anaphora, but what follows from his semantic criterion
of identity criterion may amount to the constraint I argue for here, NHTV.

1.3 Theoretical Framework
I will assume in large part the compositional, type-driven framework articulated in Heim
and Kratzer (1998). In this system, the semantic component directly interprets phrase
structure trees, or, more specifically, Logical Forms (LFs). LFs are disambiguated representations, which, in addition to representing syntactic structure, mark anaphoric relations
by co-indexing, and represent quantifier scope as the result of a rule of Quantifier Raising
(QR). When QR occurs, an indexed trace occupies the base position of the moved constituent, and an index binding that trace is adjoined to the sister of the moved constituent
(but see discussion of reconstruction in Section 4.2 below). The LF of (36a), for example,
is (minimally) that in (36b):

(36)

a. Maria described every guest.
b. LF: [IP [DP every guest] 1 [IP Maria [VP described t1]].
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In the tradition of Montague, expressions are categorized by their semantic type:
assuming as the two basic types individuals (type e) and truth values (type t), the inventory of possible semantic types and their denotation domains can be defined recursively,
as in (37).

(37)

Semantic Types
a. e and t are semantic types.
b. If a and b are semantic types, then <a,b> is a semantic type.
c. If a is a type, then <s, a> is a type.
d. Nothing else is a type.

Semantic Denotation Domains
a. De := D (the set of individuals).
b. Dt := {0,1} (the set of truth values).
c. For any semantic types ⌃ and ⌥, D<⌃,⌥> is the set of all functions from D⌃ to D⌥.

The interpretation function, || ||, assigns to each syntactic node of type a an element of Da, with respect to a variable assignment, g. The interpretation function is defined by the following rules of semantic composition, from Heim and Krazter (1998).

(38)

Lexical Terminals
If ⇥ is a terminal node occupied by a lexical item, then ||⇥|| is specified in the
lexicon.
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(39)

Non-Branching Nodes
If ⇥ is a non-branching node, and ⇤ is its daughter, then, for any assignment g, ⇥
is in the domain of || ||g if ⇤ is. In this case, ||⇥||g = ||⇤||g.

(40)

Functional Application
If ⇥ is a branching node and {⇤, ⌅} the set of its daughters, then, for any
assignment g, ⇥ is in the domain of || ||g is both ⇤ and ⌅ are, and ||⇤||g is a function
whose domain contains ||⌅||g. In this case, ||⇥||g = ||⇤||g(||⌅||g).

(41)

Predicate Modification
If ⇥ is a branching node and {⇤, ⌅} the set of its daughters, then, for any
assignment g, ⇥ is in the domain of || ||g if both ⇤ and ⌅ are, and ||⇤||g and ||⌅||g are
both of type <e,t>. In this case, ||⇥||g = ⇧x : x ↵ D . and x is in the domain of ||⇤||g
and ||⌅||g. ||⇤||g = ||⌅||g = 1.

(42)

Predicate Abstraction
Let ⇥ be a branching node whose daughters are ⇤ and ⌅, where ⇤ dominates a
numerical index i or indexed wh-word, whi.
Then, for any variable assignment g, ||⇥||g = ⇧x : x ↵D and ⌅ is in the domain of ||
||g[x/i] . ||⌅||g[x/i].
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These rules of composition, together with the assumption that phrase structure trees are at
most binary branching, ensure an extensional, compositional, type-driven semantic interpretation system.

1.3.1 The Domain of Individuals
Because my analysis rests on the assumption that D is multi-sorted, this section spells out
in more detail my assumptions about what constitutes D.

1.3.1.1 Plural Individuals
Following Link (1983), I will assume that D contains both singular and plural individuals. That is, D forms a complete atomic join semi-lattice, ordered by the ‘part of’ relation,
≤, as illustrated in (43).

(43)

a+b+c
a+b
a

b

a+c
c

…
b+c

…
…

In the structure above, a, b, and c are atomic (or singular) individuals, + is an individual
sum operator, and the lines represent the part of relation. Expressions denoting atomic
individuals include names of individuals such as John and Mary, as well as singular pronouns like he or she. Expressions denoting plural individuals include plural definite descriptions such as the boys and the girls, as well as plural pronouns like they or them.
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1.3.1.2 Kinds as Individuals
I will also assume that the domain of individuals, D, includes kinds (Carlson 1977b,
Krifka et al. 1995, and references therein). Following Krifka et al. (1995), I will model
kinds as pluralities, the sum of all instances of the kind. For example, the dog-kind, DOG,
is the sum of all dogs.21 Kinds may be mapped to properties of individuals that instantiate
them, via the predicativizing operator, ⌦, which can be defined as follows:

(44)

Predicativization
Let k be a kind. Then, ⌦k = [⇧x . x ≤ k].

Similarly, properties may be mapped to kinds by the nominalizing operator, , defined as
follows:

(45)

Nominalization
For any property P, P = the largest member of P, if the largest member of P is a
kind; undefined, otherwise.

In line with Carlson (1977b) and Chierchia (1995), I will assume what qualifies as a kind
is broad and often context-dependent:

By ‘natural’ kinds, we do not necessarily mean… just biological ones or even ‘wellestablished’ ones. Artifacts (like chairs or cars) or complex things (like intelligent students or spots of ink) can qualify as kinds, to the extent that we can impute to them a sufficiently regular behavior (cf. on this Carlson1977b, pp. 26ff. and Krifka et al. 1995).

21

This construal of kinds is a simplification, as dinds are almost certainly in fact intensional items; I believe
that this does not matter for my purposes here.
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What counts as kind is not set by grammar, but by the shared knowledge of a community
of speakers. It thus varies, to a certain degree, with the context, and remains somewhat
vague. Lexical nouns identify kinds. Complex nouns may or may not. [Chierchia 1998]

Some complex nouns, then, may correspond to kinds, while others may not, depending
on the context in which they are used. When a complex noun does not correspond to a
kind, e.g., people in the next room, it can be assumed to be out of the domain of the down
operator.

1.4 Summary
This concludes Chapter 1. In the following chapters, I will present a case for NHTV, by
(i) looking at potential counterexamples on a case-by-case basis, and (ii) showing that
hypothetical higher-type variables are systematically missing.
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CHAPTER 2
PRO-FORMS AND VARIABLES: SUCH AND ITS KIN

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will look at the syntax and semantics of a set of pro-forms that have the
syntactic distribution of higher-type expressions – adjectives and adverbs, in particular –
and thus make good candidates for higher-type variables. The focus will be the English
word such (Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1973, Carlson 1977b, Siegel 1994, Wood 2002), and
what are arguably related forms. These cases are illustrated in the following examples,
repeated from (6) – (9) above:

(46)

Those littlei cars look good, but few suchi cars are safe.

AP

(47)

You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and haughtinessi, and
if danced thusi/soi, the dance will be beautiful.

AdvP

(48)

Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does soi too.

VP

(49)

I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi.

AP

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I will argue that
such is best analyzed as associated with a variable that ranges over individuals, following
Carlson (1977b), and contra Siegel (1994), who analyzes such as a property variable. In
Section 2.3, I will extend this analysis of such to the semantics of its informal paraphrase,
adnominal like that.
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In Section 2.4, following Landman and Morzycki (2003), I will also extend this
analysis of such to its adverbial analogues in Polish and German, tak and so, with the result that these too vary over individuals. In Section 2.5, I will compare the semantics of
tak and so to adverbial like that in English.
Finally, in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, I will suggest that other instances of so in English, namely the so of do so, as well as predicative so (e.g., She seems so), also share a
semantics with such, so that all of these cases receive a unified semantics.
In each case, I re-examine the evidence for treating these expressions as highertype variables and conclude that they in fact instead vary over individuals.

2.2 What’s Such?
Such, at least at first sight, is a very good candidate for a higher-type variable. Syntactically, it appears to be adjectival, as it may occur between a determiner and a noun, a position commonly taken to be reserved for adjectives (or adjectival projections):

(50)

Several/many/three/few/most/many such mistakes were found.

Semantically, it appears to be able to pick up the reference of a preceding adjective, as
the following examples illustrate:

(51)

a. Nicei people... suchi people...
b. Littlei dogs... suchi dogs…
c. Strangei ideas... suchi ideas...
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Assuming that adjectives like nice, tall, and strange – at least at the level of their maximal projections – denote properties, these examples suggest a treatment of such as a variable ranging over properties. An analysis along these lines is in fact proposed in Siegel
(1994). However, in the spirit of Carlson (1977b), I will look at evidence that such is not
a property variable. Rather, it is associated at LF with a variable that varies over either (i)
kinds (construed here as individuals) or (ii) object individuals that instantiate kinds.

2.2.1 Setting aside the Ambiguity
Before looking further at such, it will be useful to first set aside a use of such that I will
not be concerned with here. The word such in English often gives rise to ambiguous sentences (Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1973), as (52) illustrates:

(52)

Hilda is such a scholar.

(Bresnan 1973)

On one reading, (52) might be paraphrased as ‘Hilda is that kind of scholar’ or ‘Hilda is a
scholar like that’, and on a second reading, as ‘Hilda is so much of a scholar’ or ‘Hilda is
very much a scholar’. Following the terminology of Bresnan (1973), I will refer to the
first use of such as ‘kind’ such, and the second as ‘degree’ such.22 I will for the most part
only be concerned with kind such here, since that is the use on which such acts like an
adjectival pro-form (i.e., varies depending on its linguistic environment). In order to isolate this use of such, it will be useful to point out some systematic differences between
the two uses; the remainder of this section is devoted to this end.

22

Bolinger (1972) uses the terms ‘identifier’ such and ‘intensifier’ such, respectively.
35

There are a number of properties that distinguish kind and degree such, and they
are to some extent in complementary distribution. For instance, when such occurs with a
that-clause, only its degree reading is available:

(53)

Hilda is such a scholar that all her work is impeccable.

(Bresnan 1973)

In contrast, when such occurs with an as-clause, only its kind reading is available:

(54)

Hilda is such a scholar as you were speaking of just now.

(Bresnan 1973)

The two uses also differ in the types of nominals they may modify: the degree use
of such is only available when such modifies a gradable predicate, while the kind use of
such is not subject to this restriction (Bolinger 1972).23 For example, compare the ambiguous sentences in (55) with the unambiguous examples in (56).

(55)

a. Such strange theories have become quite popular.
b. We have made such mistakes.

(56)

a. Such theories have become quite popular.
b. We have found such evidence.

23

I assume a gradable nominal is one that either contains a gradable adjective, i.e., an adjective that may
occur with degree morphemes like so, too, or as e.g., strange) or a gradable noun (e.g., mistake, loudmouth.
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In (55a-b), such occurs with a gradable predicate, e.g., strange theories and mistakes, respectively, and as a result both readings are available. In contrast, in (56a-b),
such occurs with a non-gradable nominal (e.g., theories, evidence), and only the kind
reading is available.
The two uses also differ with respect to the determiners with which they may cooccur. Only identifier such may occur between a determiner and a noun, as the following
unambiguous examples illustrate:

(57)

We have made {three/few/most/many} such mistakes.

Both uses may, however, occur in bare, i.e., determinerless, DPs, e.g., such mistakes, and
both uses may occur with the singular indefinite, e.g., such a scholar. In the latter case,
both uses must (infamously) occur before the indefinite determiner a, a peculiar, and often observed, fact:

(58)

*Hilda is a such scholar.

I will not attempt to account for this curious property of such in this work, except to note,
as have many others, that DegP’s also display this distribution:24

24

Further, neither use of such can occur with a definite determiner (including possessives):

(i)

*the/those/john’s such mistake

See further discussion in Section 2.2.7 below.
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(59)

a. Bill is that tall/too big/so boring/as smart a linguist.
b. *Bill is a that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist.

The two uses are also pronounced differently: degree such always bears a pitch
accent, while kind such may, but need not.
Finally, kind such is of a formal register, while degree such is common in both informal and formal speech. In informal speech, the expressions like that or of that kind are
preferred in place of kind such, so that, for example, such theories could be more informally paraphrased as theories like that or theories of that kind.
To sum up, the two uses of such can be distinguished by the following properties:
(i) kind such takes a subordinate as-clause, while degree such takes a subordinate thatclause; (ii) degree such only occurs with gradable nominals; (iii) kind such may occur
between a determiner and a noun, while degree such may not; (iv) degree such bears a
pitch accent, while kind such may not; and (v) kind such is of a formal register, while degree such is not.
Although I will only be analyzing the kind use of such, it is an interesting question how these two uses of such are semantically related. The two uses are at least historically related, with kind such predating intensifier such (Schiller and Need 1992;
Roger Higgins, p.c.).25 I will set this issue aside here, however, and henceforth simply use
such to refer to kind such (see, though, Landman and Morzycki (2003) for speculation on

25

Bolinger sees the semantics of degree such as derived from kind such: “...the identifier has fallen out of
many contexts except in formal register, giving way to the intensifier, probably because the ‘suchness’ of
something is so likely to be an intensifiable characteristic. We begin by viewing it as pointed to, and end by
viewing it as worthy of note, hence as enhanced.”
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the connection between kind such and degree such, in the context of a concrete proposal
for the semantics of kind such)

2.2.2 Syntax of Such
Carlson (1977b), building on Bresnan (1973), shows that such in many respects displays
the distribution of a Deg~A sequence, e.g., so tall, where so is a Deg and tall is an A
(other Degree words include e.g., that, too, so, as, how, and –er). I will follow Carlson
and Bresnan in assigning to such the same syntax as these Deg~A sequences, which I will
refer to as degree constructions.
The syntax of degree constructions has received a good amount of attention in the
literature, and a number of different analyses have been proposed to account for them. I
will adopt here what Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) refer to as the classical view, according
to which Degree words head a DegP that occupies the specifier of AP (see Chomsky
1965, Selkirk 1970, Bresnan 1973, Heim 2000, and others, and cf. Abney 1987, Corver
1990, 1997, Grimshaw 1991, Kennedy 1999, who take DegP to be the functional projection of AP):

(60)

AP
3
DegP
A’
4
4
that
tall

I will adopt an analogous syntax for such. Specifically, I will posit for such the structure
in (61), in which it is composed of two parts: the Degree word so – which is associated
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with an index, reasons for which will be spelled out in the following section – and the
adjective like:

(61)

AP (= such)
3
DegP
A’
4
4
soi
like

Further, in line with Svenonius (1993), I assume that APs may adjoin to NP:

(62)

DP
wo
D
NP
g
wo
most
AP (=such)
NP
3
g
DegP
A’
attempts
g
4
soi
like

This syntax for such is in accord with its historical development, as such derives from the
Germanic compound *swa+lk, “so-like” (Higgins, p.c.). My main justification for this
decomposition of such is that it will put such compositionally on a par with other degree
constructions (e.g., that tall, so tall, as tall); this, I will argue, explains certain syntactic
and semantic parallels between such and other Degree expressions such as so, as, and –
er, and how. This construal of such will also help elucidate its relation to its more colloquial paraphrase, like that, as the demonstrative that and the posited so appear to make
the same semantic contribution (see Section 2.3). I will motivate this syntax for such in
the remainder of this section, by showing that such has the distribution of a degree con40

struction; evidence that such has this internal structure will come from looking at its semantics, which I will justify in Sections 2.2.2-2.2.5. I will note here, however, that this
particular construal of such does not have bearing on the main claim of this thesis, which
is that such varies over individuals; other accounts of the syntax of such could easily
maintain that it varies over individuals, without positing the abstract decomposition in
(61).
Siegel (1994) argues against the complex AP syntax for such, proposing instead
that such has the distribution of a simple adjective:

(63)

DP
wo
D
NP
g
wo
most
A
NP
g
g
such
attempts

I will, however, motivate the complex AP analysis here because (i) my intuitions are
more in line with the data Carlson presents in favor of that analysis, than with Siegel’s
counterarguments, as I will show in the remainder of this section, and (ii) as stated above,
treating such as complex AP will make it possible to provide a semantic account of such
parallel to that of other degree construction, as well as to its informal paraphrase, like
that. The remainder of this section reviews the syntactic evidence for the complex AP
analysis of such.
There are several ways in which such behaves like a complex AP, and unlike a
simple adjective. First, just as complex APs must precede all other modifiers of the head
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noun, as (64) shows (i.e., the AP sicker must precede the modifier fat), so must such, as
(65) shows.

(64)

a. He is a sicker fat boxer than I had remembered.

(Carlson 1977b)

b. *He is a fat sicker boxer than I had remembered

(65)

a. I prefer such Kiswahili textbooks.
b. *I prefer Kiswahili such textbooks.

Simple adjectives, in contrast, may often precede or follow other modifiers (although
there are some well-known restrictions on their ordering):

(66)

a. He is a sick fat boxer.

(Carlson 1977b)

b. He is a fat sick boxer.

Second, just as complex APs may not co-occur with one another, as (67) shows,
such cannot modify an NP that already contains another complex AP, as (68) shows.

(67)

a. *They are fat enough sicker boxers.

(Carlson 1977b)

b. *They are sicker fat enough boxers.

(68)

a. *They are quicker such rabbits.

(Carlson 1977b)

b. *They are such quicker rabbits.

42

Simple adjectives, in contrast, may co-occur with complex APs:

(69)

They are quicker brown rabbits.

Third, like (at least some) other complex APs, such is positioned to the left of the
indefinite determiner a:26

(70)

a. Bill is that tall/too big/so boring/as smart a linguist.
b. *Bill is a that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist.

(71)

a. Such a man was here earlier.
b. *A such man was here earlier.

Simple adjectives of course do not occur in this position:

(72)

a. A well-dressed man was here earlier.
b. *Well-dressed a man was here earlier.

Fourth, such, like other DegPs, may not occur with the definite determiner, the
(Bresnan 1973):27

26

I will not attempt an explanation of this puzzling property of such here. Roger Higgins (p.c.) suggests
that the inversion (both for such as well as complex APs like so big) may due historically to the
phonological ill-formedness of having two adjacent phonologically weak functional heads. For example, so
big a boy would be a so big boy without inversion, which results in a and so being adjacent. See Section
2.2.7 for a brief discussion of the semantics of this construction.
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(73)

*Bill is the that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist.

(74)

*The such man was here earlier.

Simple adjectives are fine with the definite determiner:

(75)

The young man was here earlier.

Finally, such, like other Degree words, may take what appears to be an optional
clausal complement that has the structure of a relative clause:

(76)

a. Bill is too tall a player for us to have on the team.

(Carlson 1977b)

b. Smarter men than we have seen today do exist.
c. Bill is as nice as Julie is.
d. Such people as we have seen today should be given a second chance.

To summarize, such is like a complex AP, and unlike a simple adjective, in that it
(i) must precede other nominal modifiers, (ii) cannot co-occur with other complex APs,
(iii) precedes the indefinite determiner, a, (iv) may not occur with the definite determiner
the, and (v) occurs with an optional complement clause that has the structure of a relative
clause.
Siegel finds the sentences in (65b) and (68) acceptable, and concludes that such is
a simple adjective. Although Carlson and Siegel disagree over sentences that are some27

The incompatibility of DegPs with the definite determiner is probably a semantic issue, and not a syntactic one, but the parallel still holds.
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times rather hard to judge, I find my own intuitions more in line with Carlson’s, and so
will adopt his syntax. Further, as stated above, this syntax will make possible a compositional semantics for such straightforwardly parallel to degree constructions, as well as to
its informal paraphrase, like that (as shown at the end of the next section, Section 2.2.3.)

2.2.3 Semantics of Such
As observed above, examples like the following (repeated from above) suggest an account of such as a property variable, as such appears to pick up the reference of a preceding adjective:

(51)

a. Nice people... such people...
b. Little dogs... such dogs…
c. Strange ideas... such ideas...

In fact, as Carlson observes, such appears to be able to pick up the reference of virtually
any sort of NP modifier, “be it adjective, PP, relative clause, or participle.” He provides
the following examples:

(77)

a. Old ladies… such ladies…

(Carlson 1977b)

b. People owning dogs... such dogs...
c. Cats without tails… such cats…
d. People who eat fish… such people…
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These examples suggest a treatment of such as a property variable, taking as its value a
property that corresponds to an expression that may modify a nominal, e.g., an AP, PP,
CP, or gerund.28
There are, however, several empirical problems for this sort of approach, as both
Carlson and Siegel observe. For one, such seems to be able to pick up the reference of
constituents that are not modifiers. For example, in the following, such seems to refer
back to whole DPs:

(78)

a. “Honest money lenders? There are no such people.”
b. “... with politicians, journalists, and other such important personages.”
(Carlson 1977b), attributed to Jespersen (1927)

Examples like these, as both Carlson and Siegel conclude, suggest that whole DPs – and
not just nominal modifiers – antecede such. Thus, in an example like (51a), repeated below, the antecedent of such would be the whole DP nice people, and not just the modifier
nice:

(51)

a. Nice people... such people...

Carlson and Siegel, however, draw different conclusions about the semantics of such
from these sorts of examples. Siegel argues that such is indeed a property variable, but

28

Note that since there is no formal way to distinguish properties denoted by modifiers (e.g., tall) from
properties denoted by nominals (e.g, women), there is nothing here that would ensure that such would be
assigned an adjectival property rather than a nominal property. This point will be relevant for the discussion
of Siegel’s account of such below.
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subject to the restriction that its syntactic antecedent must be a common noun phrase
(here, an NP, given the DP hypothesis), and not an AP. NPs, like APs, are commonly
taken to denote properties; thus, by Siegel’s account, such would be a property variable,
but require an NP antecedent. For example, the antecedent for such in (78) and (51a)
would be whatever corresponds to an NP in a bare plural (there are numerous proposals
about the syntax of bare plurals, so this could be, e.g., either the bare plural itself, or
some layer within a bare plural). Siegel supports this account of such with the contrast
between (79a-b) below: (79b) would be judged bad because in it the NP tall men corefers with such, with the result that such women yields the intersection of ‘the contradictory predicates woman, and tall man.’

(79)

a. All tall men believe that employers prefer such people. S., [28]
b. *All tall men believe that employers prefer such women.

The main problem with this analysis, however, is that not just any nominal may antecede
such, as Carlson observes. In particular, nominals denoting properties that do not correspond to kinds do not make good antecedents for such, which suggests that such is anaphoric not to a property, but to a kind. Consider, for instance, the following examples, in
which such is used infelicitously; note that intuitively, these examples are judged unacceptable because the anteceding bare plurals do not provide enough information about a
kind (of people, elephants, men, or quarters) to permit the use of such; for instance, (80a)
is judged ungrammatical because people in the next room does not provide enough information about a kind of people to permit the use of such.
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(80)

a. People in the next room… ??such people (are obnoxious)
b. Elephants that are standing there… ??such elephants
c. Men that Jan fired this morning… ??such men
d. Quarters that I put in the meter yesterday… ??such quarters
(Carlson 1977b)

However, (80a) may in fact be judged acceptable if further information from the linguistic or non-linguistic context makes salient a kind of people. Consider, for example, a context in which the people in the next room happen to be making a lot of noise. The following might then be uttered, in which such is used acceptably:29

(81)

I can’t stand the people in the next room. Such people are obnoxious.

Importantly, in this context, people in the next room can be used to recover a kind from
the context, namely, the kind LOUD PEOPLE, and as a result such may be used to pick out
this kind of people. The important point here is that a kind of people cannot be made sali-

29

Thanks to Angelika Kratzer for pointing out examples like (81), in which an instance of a kind appears to
antecede such. She suggests based on these examples that such is associated with an object variable that
instantiates a kind; see further discussion on this issue immediately below. Barbara Partee (p.c.) provides
similar examples in which expressions denoting object individuals – and not kind -- appears to either antecede or make salient a kind for such:
(i)

a.
b.

Two men came in. I had never seen such men before.
War and Peace, Gone With the Wind, and other such hefty classics…
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ent just by virtue of their being in the next room. Rather, some kind of people must be
made salient to permit the use of such.30
Kinds, for Carlson, are modeled as a special type of individual in D (see again
Section 1.3.1.2 for my assumptions about the representation of kinds). Linguistic expressions that denote kinds – bare plurals, for example – have unique properties, which the
bare plurals in (80) do not share. For instance, only kind-denoting bare plurals may occur
as arguments to the so-called kind-level predicates, e.g., extinct, widespread, common,
and rare. While bare plurals are generally fine as arguments to these predicates, as (82)
shows, the bare plurals in (80) are odd, as (83) shows.

(82)

a. People are common.
b. Elephants are extinct.
c. Men are widespread.
d. Quarters are rare.

(83)

a. ??Polar bears in the next room are extinct.
b. ??Elephants that are standing there are widespread.
c. ??Men that Jan fired this morning are common.
d. ??Quarters that I put in the meter yesterday are rare.

Carlson suggests that what blocks the bare plurals in (83) – those that may not antecede
such – from denoting kinds is that they “refer to a finite set of things, which must exist at
30

Siegel judges these examples grammatical, and so sees such as denoting a semantically unrestricted property variable. However, from her discussion, it seems that she finds these examples judged grammatical in
exactly those contexts in which a kind would be made salient.
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a certain time in a given world.” Such a closed class of individuals does not make for a
good kind.
In light of these facts, Carlson proposes analyzing such as a property of individuals that instantiate a free variable ranging over kinds, as (84) illustrates:31,32

(84)

||suchi||g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i)

Note that this denotation for such does not violate NHTV; although such itself is of a
higher-type, the variable it contains is itself of type e, assuming that kinds are modeled as
individuals. Such, thus, although of a higher-type, varies only over individuals. Given the
semantics in (84), such may combine with the nominal it modifies by Predicate Modification, yielding, e.g., in (85), a property of individuals that both instantiate a contextually
salient kind and are dogs:

(85)

||suchi dogs||g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i) & dogs(x)

31

I will decompose this semantics for such below, to fit the syntax in (61), where such is analyzed as the
composition of so and like. However, at the level of AP, the semantics I adopt will be as stated here.
32

Carlson’s semantics for such in fact includes a presupposition that I have left out here, specifically, under
Carlson’s account, the value of the variable associated with such must be subkind of whatever kind corresponds to the nominal such modifies. This is to account for the contrast in (i):
(i)

a.
b.

German Shepards… such dogs…
#Dogs… such German Shepards…

(Carlson 1977b)

(ib) is predicted to be a presupposition failure, since GERMAN SHEPARDS, the value assigned to such, is not
subkind of the kind DOGS. I have chosen to leave out this pressuposition here, due to counterexamples like
(ii):
(ii)
CATS

Longhaired dogs can be difficult to brush. Such cats are even worse.
of course could not be a subkind of DOGS, but the example nevertheless is grammatical.
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Expressions occurring higher in the nominal projection (determiners, for example) may
then combine semantically with this property:33,34

(86)

||all such dogs||g = ⇧f<e,t> . for all x such that x is a dog, f(x) = 1.

This account of such, in effect, explains the unacceptable examples in (80): because such contains a kind variable, it may not anteceded by a non-kind-denoting nominal, unless that nominal itself makes salient a kind, as in (81).
Adopting the syntax for such in (87) below (repeated from above), I will derive
this semantics of such as the result of combining so and like. Specifically, so denotes a
variable over kinds or objects, as in (88), while like relates a kind and an individual – specifically, it maps a kind to the property of objects that instantiate that kind – as in (89) (I
will motivate this semantics for like in Section 2.3). Combining these two expressions by
functional application produces the semantics for such in (90), which is essentially the
same as that proposed by Carlson in (84) above.35

33

See section 2.2.6 for discussion of restrictions on the types of determiners that may occur with such.

34

Wilkinson (1991) proposes denotations semantically equivalent to the one for such above (and like that
below) for (at least some uses of) the modifiers of that kind and that kind of, as in an animal of that kind
and that kind of animal. Given that they might all receive the same semantics, it would be interesting to
look closely at potential differences between these four expressions.
35

I motivate this semantics for like in Section X below, based on the use of like in the expression like that.
Note, however, that in that section, I will argue that like is ambiguous, and also has a use in which it relates
two object individuals, as in, e.g., like John.
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(87)

AP: such
3
DegP
A’
4
4
soi
like

(88)

||soi||g = g(i)

(89)

||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k]

(90)

||such|| = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i)

This makes for a clear parallel between such and degree constructions like that tall: the
so in such provides a kind argument to like, just as that provides a degree argument to
tall, assuming that tall is a relation between degrees and individuals (Cresswell 1976, von
Stechow 1984, Heim 2000, among others).
There is some evidence that the variable associated with such may range not only
over kinds but also over object individuals (henceforth, objects). For instance, Angelika
Kratzer, p.c., points out that examples like those in (91) suggest that such is associated
with an object variable rather than a kind variable; quantification here appears to be over
objects (i.e., particular mistakes), and such seems to co-vary with each mistake:36

(91)

a. Every time a mistake occurred, we wondered whether some such
mistake might occur again.

36

These examples are puzzling, however, given that co-variation with such is in general not possible with a
quantificational subject, e.g., the following example is true iff everyone must likes reading some contextually salient type of books:
(i)

Everyone likes reading such books.

I am not sure how to reconcile these facts.
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b. For every mistake that occurred, we wondered whether some such
mistake might occur again.

To account for the examples in (91), I will assume here that the variable associated with
so (internal to such) may range over either (i) kinds or (ii) objects that instantiate kinds;
and, further, that like is ambiguous, denoting either a relation between kinds and objects
(as in (89) above), or a relation between objects and objects, as in (92) below.37

(92)

||like2||g = ⇧x . [⇧y . there is a unique contextually salient kind k such that x ≤ k and
y≤k

According to (92), this second use of like maps an object x to the property of objects that
instantiate a unique contextually salient that x also instantiates. Combining this second
use of like with so produces a second semantics for such:

(93)

||soi like2||g = ⇧x . there is a unique contextually salient kind y such that g(i)
≤ y and x ≤ y

In the next section, I will support the analysis of such by which it is associated
with an individual variable by looking at the semantic behavior of what is arguably its
optional complement, the as-clause italicized in the following:

37

Again, I will motivate this ambiguity in Section 2.3, where I look directly at the semantics of like. In
short, I see this ambiguity as analogous to the behavior of like, which may combine with a kind, e.g., like
that, or an object, e.g., like him.
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(94)

Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society. (Carlson 1977b)

Much of the section will focus on parallels between these as-clauses and the (apparent)
complement clauses of other Degree words, e.g., than-clauses:

(95)

Smarter women than we met yesterday have made worse mistakes.

2.2.4 Such-as-Relatives
Another strategy for getting at the semantics of such is to look at the semantic contribution of what appears to be its optional complement, an as-relative:38

(96)

Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society. (Carlson 1977b)

In addition to as-relatives, such may also occur with an as-phrase, in which case only a
DP follows as:

(97)

Such women as Frieda are a credit to society.

(Carlson 1977b)

These (putative) complements of such are in this respect like the (putative) complements
of degree words, which may also be either clausal or phrasal:
38

Although these as-relatives sound antiquated in present-day English, I believe that judgments regarding
their use are clear enough to posit an analysis for them. Further, I will show in Section 2.3 below that the
analogous – but more informal – like-relative, illusrated in (i), behaves just like the as-relative (Landman
2002).
(i)

Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society.
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(98)

a. Smarter women than we met yesterday have made worse mistakes.
b. Smarter women than Frieda have made worse mistakes.

There is some evidence that as-relatives should indeed be construed as complements to such, even though the two are syntactically non-adjacent.39 First, the presence of
the as-relative is clearly dependent on such. Such, may not, for example, occur with a
relative introduced by than. Second, I will present evidence below suggesting that such
and as-relatives can take scope together and thus form a semantic constituent. Accordingly, I will assume that such and as-relatives form a syntactic constituent to the exclusion of the modified noun at LF, as in (99b) (abstracting away for the moment from the
internal structure of the as-relative, and taking without justification the as-relative to be a
PP):

(99)

a. such women as there were at the party
b.

NP
qp
AP
NP
3
g
DegP
A
women
3
g
Deg
PP
like
g
6
so as there were at the party
Compare this structure to analogous LFs that have been proposed for comparatives, in
which the Degree head and a than- or such-as- relative are taken to form a constituent
39

Reasoning here will be similar to that of Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) for the relationships between a Degree head and a comparative clause.
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(Bresnan 1973, 1975, Cresswell 1976, Heim 1985, and others); following Bresnan 1973,
more is taken here to be the combination of er + many:40

(100) a. taller women than there were at the party
b.

NP
qp
AP
NP
3
g
DegP
A
women
3
g
Deg
PP
tall
g
6
er
than there were at the party
(101) a. more women than there were at the party

b.

NP
qp
AP/QP
NP
3
g
DegP
A/Q
women
3
g
Deg
PP
many
g
6
er
than there were at the party

What, intuitively, seems to be the semantic contribution of these as-complements?
One possibility is that they directly supply such with the value of its kind variable. These
complements, then, might be construed as a definite description of a kind (or an object
40

Heim footnotes that this structure is “probably wrong”. Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) propose an more recent account of comparatives that accounts for the fact that than-clauses behave as if they semantically
form a constituent with the Degree head, while remaining consistent with what is known about extraposition. I believe that an analysis of this sort could be posited for as-clauses without affecting the main arguments here.
56

that instantiates a kind), analogous to some analyses of than-phrases as definite descriptions of a degree in comparative constructions (Russell 1905, Cresswell 1976). An alternative possibility is that they provide a restriction on the variable associated with such
(Carlson 1977b). For example, in (96), any kind assigned to such would have to also be
the kind of woman that we met yesterday. To get a better idea of what the external semantics of these as-phrases might be, I will at this point take a closer look at its internal
semantics for clues.
For the internal semantics of these clauses, I will motivate the structure in (102),
in which there is covert wh-movement internal to these relatives (I abstract away momentarily from the exact position from which the wh-operator moves, as indicated by the “to
be further articulated” note; ultimately, I will posit the structure in (110) below):
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(102) a. such women as there were at the party
b.

NP
[to be further articulated]
qp
AP
NP
3
g
DegP
A
women
3
g
Deg
PP
like
g
3
so
P
CP
g
3
as whi
C’
3
C
IP
3
DP
I’
g
6
there were t1 at the party

That these as-relatives contain CPs that involve covert wh-movement is evidenced by examples that show that this movement is subject to island constraints. Compare for example, (103), (104), and (105): only in the latter, ungrammatical, examples would the whoperator move out of an island.

(103) Such issues as John raised __ at the meeting have been resurfacing for years.
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(104) Complex NP Island Constraint
a. *Such issues as John made the claim that he raised __ at the meeting have
been resurfacing for years.
b. *Such issues as I know the person who claimed that he raised __ at the
metting have been resurfacing for years.

(105) Adjunct Island Constraint
*Such issues as John laughed when I raised __ at the meeting have been
resurfacing for years.

There is some evidence that the variable abstracted over in as-relatives ranges
over kinds.41 The argumentation here is in the spirit of Carlson (1977a, 1977b), and follows similar reasoning that has been presented for comparative clauses (see, e.g., Carlson
1977a and Heim 1987).42 To begin with, the gap in a such-as-relative may follow there
be:

(106) Such women as there were __ at the party are a credit to society.
(Carlson 1977b)

These relatives are in this respect like comparatives (Carlson 1977b, Heim 1987 and others):

41

I believe that the same argument could be presented to show that the variable in as-relatives could also
range over individuals.
42

See also Section 4.2 below for a discussion of the interpretation of gaps following there be.
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(107) More women than there were __ at the party came to the show.

In contrast, restrictive relatives do not permit a gap following there be:43

(108) *Women that there were __ at the party came to the show.

Heim (1987), following Carlson, explains this as due to a constraint barring individual
variables from the position following there be – an instance of the Definiteness Restriction of Milsark (1974, 1977):

(109) *There be x, when x is an individual variable.

Assuming that individual variables cannot occupy the position following there be, (109)
can be explained if such as-relatives involve a narrow scope occurrence of an indefinite
of the form k-like NP in the position of the gap, with the wh-operator binding the kind
variable, as in the LF posited in (110b). Note that in this structure, I have posited some
unpronounced syntactic structure, in particular, deletion of like and women, which I will
motivate shortly below following similar reasoning that has been presented for comparative clauses (see Carlson 1977a; Heim 1987, and others):

43

With the exception of amount or kind relatives (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman (1998),
and others; see discussion of (163) below.
60

(110) a. such women as there were at the party

b.

NP
qp
AP
NP
3
g
DegP
A
women
3
g
Deg
PP
like
g
3
so
P
CP
g
3
as whi
C’
3
C
IP
3
DP
I’
g
rp
there I
VP
g
rp
were2
NP
V’
3
rp
AP
NP V
PP
3
g
g
6
DegP
A women t2
at the party
g
g
t1
like
Similarly, such-as-relatives, unlike restrictive relatives, permit gaps in the position of predicate nominals:

(111) a. Such people as John believes those murderers are __.
b. *People that John believes those murderers are __.
(based on Carlson 1977b)
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The contrast between these examples is again explained if the gap in the such-as-relative
is the indefinite k-like people, while the gap in the restrictive relative is an individual
variable, assuming that predicate nominals are interpreted as predicates, and not individuals.
Further support for the LF in (102), and in particular treating so and the such-asrelative as forming a constituent, comes from the behavior of these relatives with respect
to Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD); the reasoning here again follows that proposed
for comparatives, in particular, that of Wold (1995) and Heim (2000). Such-as-relatives
allow ACD when modifying a weak nominal, but not when modifying a strong nominal:44

(112) Weak nominals:
a. I never had such problems as you do.
b. Ruben read such books as David did
c. John climbed such trees as Bill did.
d. I considered several such solutions as you did.

(113) Strong nominals:
a. #I have every such problem as you do.
b. #Ruben read most such books as David did.
c. #John was climbing every such tree as Bill was.
d. #I considered every such solution as you did.

44

Thanks to Uli Sauerland for suggesting I look at ACD in these clauses.
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Interestingly, this is the opposite of the pattern observed for that-relative clauses, where
only strongly quantified noun phrases may move (Carlson 1977a, Diesing 1992):

(114) I read every/each/most books that you did.
(115) *I read few/two/

books that you did.

Diesing (1992) explains the contrast between (114) and (115) by assuming that ACD is
resolved by Quantifier Raising, and that only strongly quantified noun phrases QR (Diesing 1992). But this does not explain the reversed ACD pattern for such as-relatives. To
account for the good ACD cases with such as relatives (where the head of the relative is
weak), a story can be told which mirrors the story Wold (1995) tells for similar data with
comparatives (for a more recent variant of this analysis, see Bhatt and Pancheva 2004).
Carlson (1977a) and Diesing (1992) had noted that ACD is possible in comparatives even
if the head noun is weak (example based on Heim 2000):

(116) John was climbing more trees than Bill was.

Wold (1995) showed that cases like (116) can be explained by QR-ing the DegP, assuming that the DegP is a generalized quantifier over degrees (that is, the DegP must move to
resolve a type mismatch). The DegP containing the elided VP thus moves out of the antecedent VP, and, in effect, the elided VP has an (appropriately) identical antecedent for
ellipsis. The weak nominal stays in VP, and gets existentially closed:
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(117) [DegP -er than [CP wh1 Bill was climbing d1-many trees]] 1 John was climbing d1many trees

The whole structure then gets interpreted as follows:

(118) ||[DegP -er than [CP wh1 Bill was climbing d1-many trees]] 1 John was climbing d1many trees||g is true iff the number of trees that John was climbing is greater than
the number of trees that Bill was climbing

Wold’s argument can be straightforwardly used to explain the grammatical ACD cases in
such-as-relatives. What moves is not the whole DP, but the DegP that contains the elided
VP, so that, e.g., the LF for (119a) would be that in (119b).

(119) a. John was climbing such trees as Bill was.
b. [DegP so [PP as [CP wh1 Bill was [VP climbing k1-like trees]]] 1 John was [VP
climbing k1-like trees]

To interpret this structure, so can here be taken to denote (the schoenfinkelized functional
equivalent of) a relation between sets of kinds:

(120) ||so||g = ⇧f<k, t> . [ ⇧g<k, t> . there is a kind k such that f(k) = 1 and g(k) = 1]
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The so of such as a result would be treated here as ambiguous between a deictic, referential interpretation, in which case it refers to a kind or object, and a quantificational interpretation, in which case it denotes a relation between sets of kinds. In this way, so seems
to act very much the Degree word as, which also appears to have a deictic, referential
use, e.g., He is as tall, and a quantificational use, e.g., He is as tall as Jane. Given (120),
John was climbing such trees as Bill was is predicted to be true iff there is some k such
that John and Bill were climbing trees of kind k:

(121) ||[DegP so [PP as [CP wh1 1 Bill was [VP climbing k1-like trees]]] 1 John was [VP
climbing k1-like trees]||g = 1 iff there is a k such that John was climbing trees of
kind k and Bill was climbing trees of kind k
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(122) a. such women as there were at the party

b.

NP
qp
AP
NP
3
g
DegP
A
women
3
g
Deg
PP
like
g
3
so
P
CP
g
3
as whi
C’
3
C
IP
3
DP
I’
g
rp
there I
VP
g
rp
were2
NP
V’
3
rp
AP
NP V
PP
3
g
g
6
DegP
A women t2
at the party
g
g
t1
like

The good ACD examples in (112) above, then, are accounted for as the result of movement of DegP. The bad examples in (113) – those that illustrate the incompatibility of
these relatives with strong determiners – could be explained as due to Kennedy’s ban on
movement out of a quantificational DP (Kennedy 1999, Heim 2000): in these cases, the
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quantificational DegP cannot move out of a quantificational DP, and ungrammaticality
results (Ora Mathushanksy and Chris Kennedy, p.c.).45
Having spelled out a semantics for the such-as-clause, a parallel semantics can
now be posited for such-as phrases.

2.2.5 Such-as-Phrases
Such-as-phrases occur in examples like the following, in which only a DP follows as:

(123) Such women as Frieda are a credit to society.

It is difficult to determine the semantics of these as-phrases, as there seems to be more
than one way to analyze them, and it is hard to argue for one account over the other.
There are some clues, however, and I will at least sketch an account here.
It will be useful to first address an ambiguity that may arise with these phrases
when they occur post-nominally. Consider, for example, the sentences in (123), which
illustrate two, truth-conditionally non-equivalent uses of post-nominal such-as-phrases.

(124) a. Cats, such as yours, have no hair.
b. Cats such as yours have no hair.

45

Given this explanation, it would be predicted that such-as-relatives could never modify DP’s headed by
strong determiners, a prediction that appears to be borne out:
(i)

a.
b.

??Sam appreciates most such comments as Maria gives.
?*Most such examples as you presented were marginal.
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In (124a), the such-as-phrase is an appositive, in which case an intonational break precedes and follows it. This contrasts with (124b), where it is a restrictive modifier, in
which case there is no intonational break. The examples are not truth-conditionally
equivalent: in a situation in which your cat has no hair, the first could be judged false,
while the second would be judged true. I will only be concerned with the latter, restrictive
use of as-phrases here; note that this restrictive use seems to be the only one available
when such precedes the modified nominal, so that the following seems to be truthconditionally equivalent to (124b):

(125) Such cats as yours have no hair.

The semantic contribution of the as-phrase appears to be that of helping fix the
kind associated with such, which would otherwise be supplied by the context. The asphrase, then, can be construed as a restriction on the contextually salient kind. Accordingly, I will take the as-phrase as a property of kinds, which the kind associated with such
must satisfy.46 This property appears to be constructed from the DP object of as, which
itself does not appear to denote a kind, but rather an individual that instantiates (or exemplifies) a contextually salient kind (Carlson 1977b). Consider, for example, the following:

46

Alternatively, as-phrases might be taken to denote definite descriptions of kinds. See the following footnote for a more spelled out version of this possibility. I have chosen the above analysis instead of this one
rather arbitrarily, since I do not see at this point strong evidence for one analysis over the other.
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(126) Such men as Bill/those men/my friends/?several of my friends/?all my
friends/*some people/*lots of Africans/*everybody
(Carlson 1977b)

As Carlson puts it, “it seems the less easy it is to take the NP as picking out some particular person or set of persons that the speaker could have in mind as examples, the less acceptable the NP.”[p. 391]. This would also explain the following contrast (repeated from
above), which again show that the DP object of as should instantiate the kind associated
with such:

(127) a. *I want to read such books as you.
b. I want to read such books as those.
c. I want to read such books as you suggested.

These examples can be accounted for if as is taken to map an individual to a set of kinds
that that object instantiates:47

(128) ||as||g = ⇧x . [ ⇧k : x ≤ k ]

47

More precisely, as could be taken as a function from individuals to kinds:

(i)

||as||g = ⇧x : there is a unique salient kind in the context such that x ≤ k .
the unique salient kind in the context such that x ≤ k.

Here also, it would be a question how exactly such would combine with the as-phrase. One option would
be to give such an extra argument:
(ii)

||such||g = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k]
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Given (128), the as-phrase as a whole will then denote a set of kinds:

(129) ||as Mary||g = ⇧k . Mary ≤ k

The question at this point is how the as-phrase semantically combines with such. One
option is to treat the as-phrase as providing a restriction on the contextually salient kind
assigned to such, so that the result of combining the two would be, e.g.:48

(130) ||such as Mary||g = ⇧x . x ≤ k and Mary ≤ k

This property could then itself combine with an NP property, so that, e.g., (131a) would
be interpreted as in (131b).

(131) a. such women as Mary
b. ||[DegP such asi Mary] women|| = ⇧x . women(x) and x ≤ the unique salient k
such that Mary ≤ k

2.2.6 Summary
Support for the hypothesis that such is associated with an individual variable comes from
two points: (i) possible antecedents for such need to be kind-denoting or kindinstantiating, and (ii) the behavior of such-as-relatives is analogous to that of compara-

48

I do not see an elegant way of getting this result, but again giving such an extra argument would do the
trick:
(i)

||such||g = ⇧f<k, t> . [⇧x . x ≤ k and f(k) = 1]
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tives – which arguably involve abstraction over degrees – in permitting a gap after there
be, as well as allowing ACD in weakly modified nominals. Both of these properties can
be accounted for by analyzing the gap in as-relatives as an indefinite containing a variable over kinds, viz., k-like NP. The analysis of such presented here thus both supports
NHTV, and provides an account of the parallels between degree and kind morphology.

2.2.7 Restrictions on Co-occurring Determiners
I will conclude this study of such with some comments on the restrictions such imposes
on the types of determiners with which it may co-occur. Such may not co-occur with a
definite determiner unless one, only, or first immediately follow the definite determiner,
as the examples in (132) illustrate:

(132) a. *the/those/John’s such ideas
b. the only/first/one such idea

Such also blocks specific readings of singular indefinites, for example, (a) is ambiguous
between a specific and non-specific reading of the indefinite, while (b) permits only a
non-specific reading.

(133) a. I didn’t see a spot on the floor.

specific and nonspecific

b. I didn’t see such a spot on the floor.
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nonspecific only

Interestingly, the ban on definites occurring with such also appears to hold in German
and Spanish (and potentially Irish, Jim McCloskey, p.c.). It thus appears that definite determiners cannot semantically combine (at least directly) with nominals modified by
such. It seems related to this puzzle that singular indefinites with such seem to be lacking
specific readings. While I am not at all sure why the specific readings are absent here, I
suspect that it related to the fact that the definite determiners cannot co-occur with such,
either.

2.3 Like that
Such, on its kind use, is of a formal register; in more informal conversation it could be
naturally paraphrased with the expression like that. For example, (134b) would be a natural informal paraphrase of (134a).

(134) a. I have such toothbrushes.
b. I have toothbrushes like that.

Similarly, such as-phrases may be paraphrased with corresponding like-phrases:

(135) a. I have toothbrushes such as his.
b. I have toothbrushes like his.

There are even counterparts to the such as-relative:
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(136) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.
(137) Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society.

The similarity in use of such and like that raises the question of what the semantic connection is between the two, and, in particular, whether like that is also associated with an
individual variable, or rather, a property variable. I will argue here for the former, and
posit an interpretation for like which parallels quite closely the semantics proposed above
for such.

2.3.1 Syntax of Like That
The syntax of like is hard to peg. On the one hand, like patterns like an adjective, as it
may occur with degree morphology:

(138) a. She is really like that.
b. She is more like that than you are.

However, unlike an adjective, and like a preposition, very may not modify like without
the presence of much:49

49

Predicate nominals also require the presence of much with very:

(i)

a.
b.

She is sometimes very much a fool.
*She is sometimes very a fool.
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(139) a. She is too/so/very much like that.
b. She is very interested.
c. She is very much below you.

Also unlike an adjective, but like a preposition, like may take a DP complement:

(140) a. She is like that.
b. *She is interested that.
c. She is below you.

These sorts of facts make it hard to tell what syntactic category like belongs to. Keeping
these examples in mind, I will go ahead and assume like is an adjective here, for concreteness.

2.3.2 Semantics of Like That
Given the semantics of such, it seems natural to ask whether like that also involves
anaphora to a kind. One way of testing this is to use Carlson’s diagnostic for such: Can
like that refer back to an antecedent that is not kind-denoting? The following sentences
suggest that it cannot:

(141) a. People in the next room…??people like that
b. Elephants that are standing there…??elephants like that
c. Men that Jan fired this morning…??men like that
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It is again important to stress here that these examples are judged unacceptable only if
like that takes as antecedent the preceding italicized bare plural, and not some contextually salient kind. For example, if (141a) were uttered in a context where people in the
next room were loud, this example would be felicitous if like that meant loud people, and
not people in the next room. The important point is that like that requires a contextually
salient kind as its antecedent; it cannot modify people to pick out the set of people who
are in the next room.

(142) I don’t like the people in the next room. People like that are obnoxious.

Based on these examples, like that can be taken to be the semantic composition of
like – a relation between kinds and individuals, as in (143) – and that, a variable that
ranges over kinds, as in (144).

(143) ||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k]

(144) ||thati||g = g(i)

Assuming the syntax in (145), like and that would then combine semantically, yielding a
semantics identical to that of such, as in (146).
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(145)

A’: like that
3
A
DP
g
g
like
thati

(146) ||like thati|| g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i)

As with such, however, there is also a use of like by which it combines with an
expression that denotes an object. Examples like (147) suggest that like takes as its first
argument an individual that exemplifies a kind – just as Carlson observed with as in
(126) above, repeated below.

(147) People like you/Bill/him are hard to please.

These examples instead suggest that like may take as its first argument an object that instantiates a kind:

(148) ||like|| = ⇧x . [ ⇧y . there is a salient kind k such that x ≤ k and y ≤ k]

According to this semantics, like relates two individuals that both instantiate a salient
kind.
Interestingly, like that appears to impose the same restrictions as such does on the
kinds of determiners with which it may co-occur. For example, nominals modified by like
that are degraded when headed by a definite determiner, as (149a) shows, unless one,
only, or first immediately follow the definite determiner, as (149b) shows.
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(149) a. ?the/that/his solution like that
b. the only/one/first solution like that

Likewise, specific readings of singular indefinites again seem to be absent, as was the
case with such:

(150) a. Paul didn’t see a spot.

specific or non-specific

b. Paul didn’t see a spot like that.

non-specific only

While I do not have an explanation for this pattern, the similarity in behavior to such does
suggest that assigning them a parallel semantics is on the right track.

2.3.3 Like-Relatives
Like-relatives, as illustrated in (151), are the informal counterpart of the as-relative, as
illustrated in (152):

(151) Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society.
(152) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.

In this section, I will present evidence that the variable abstracted over in these relatives,
as in as-relatives, ranges over individuals.
These relatives give rise to ambiguity when modifying an object NP, and so, before going further, I will try to make clear which readings I will be looking at, and which
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I will be setting aside. Consider, for example, (153), which is three-ways-ambiguous between what I will call a conjunctive reading, a manner reading, and a kind reading:

(153) She buys toothbrushes like you do.
a. She buys toothbrushes, and you buy toothbrushes.

conjunctive

b. She buys toothbrushes how you buy toothbrushes.

manner

c. She buys toothbrushes like the ones that you buy.

kind

I will only be concerned with the kind reading in this section; the manner reading will be
discussed in 2.5 below, and the conjunctive reading I will set aside completely. That the
three readings are truly distinct is suggested by the fact that they are to some extent in
complementary distribution.50 In particular, only the kind reading is available when the
like-relative occupies a position reserved for nominal modifiers; similarly, only the manner and conjunctive readings are available when the like-relative occurs in a position in
which only verbal modifiers may occur. For example, only the kind reading is available
when the like-relative modifies a subject nominal:

(154) a. More women like we met at the party should be running this country.
b. It’s women like we met at the party that should be running this country.

The kind reading is also the only reading available when there is no VP Ellipsis in the
like-relative:
50

Thanks to Marcin Morzycki (p.c.) and Kyle Rawlins (p.c.) for pressing me to show that the kind and
manner readings are distinct (they remain skeptical.)
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(155) She buys toothbrushes like you buy __.
cf. She buys toothbrushes like you do.

In contrast, when like-relatives occur in positions that nominal modifiers may not occur,
only the manner and conjunctive readings are possible. For example, the kind reading is
not available when these relatives immediately follow the particle (of a particle verb) as
in (156a), as compared to (156b), which is ambiguous:

(156) a. I messed several solutions up like you did.
b. I messed up several solutions like you did.

This is expected if rightward movement of the particle makes it impossible for the likerelative to modify the nominal several solutions. I will thus assume that the kind and
manner readings are distinct.
Turning now to their internal structure, there is some evidence that like-relatives
are in fact elliptical, so that, for example, (157) corresponds to the LF in (158), in which
the kind/one(s) is elided:

(157) theories like you presented
(158) theories like the kind/one(s) [wh1 that you presented t1]
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Evidence for this is as follows: A unique property of restrictive that-relatives is that they
generally disallow a subject from being relativized if the complementizer that is not
overt, as the following contrast shows.

(159) a. The guys [wh 1 that t1 live next door] are hard to talk to.
b. *The guys [wh 1 t1 live next door] are hard to talk to.

Like-relative show the same pattern, as it is ungrammatical for the subject of a likerelative to be relativized:

(160) *Guys like [wh1 t1 live next door] are hard to talk to.
cf. Guys like you know are hard to talk to.

Based on these examples, I will assume henceforth that like-relatives are elided versions
of their nominal paraphrases, as reflected by the LF in (158) above.
Like as-relatives, the gap in a like-relative may follow there be:

(161) a. More women like there were at the party should run for office.
b. He wants more toys like the ones that there were at the store.

This suggests that the gap in a like-relative corresponds to a weak indefinite:

(162) like the women [CP wh1 there were k1-like women at the party]
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This makes these relatives look very much like amount relatives (see Chapter 4), which
also permit relativization following there-be:

(163) The women that there were at the party couldn’t have filled a bathtub.

They especially look like amount relatives if, as I am proposing, these relatives are derived from structures in which they contain restrictive relative clauses, allowing for paraphrases like the following:

(164) a. More women like the ones there were at the party should run for office.
b. He wants more toys like the ones that there were at the store.

Further, like such-as-relatives and comparative clauses, they permit ACD when modifying a weak nominal, but not when modifying a strong nominal:

(165) Weak nominals
a. I never had problems like you do.
b. Ruben read several books like David did.
c. John climbed trees like Bill did.
d. I considered several solutions like you did.
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(166) Strong nominals
a. #I have every problem like you do.
b. #Ruben read most books like David did.
c. #John was climbing every tree like Bill was.
d. #I considered every solution like you did.

Here also, it appears like-relatives may be categorically bad with strong determiners, with
or without ACD:

(167) a. ?*I’ve considered every solution like you suggested, and none seems to work.
b. ?*Most examples like you came up with were marginal.

Again, this is the opposite of the pattern observed for that-relative clauses (Carlson
1977a, Diesing 1992):

(168) a. I read every/each/most books that you did.
b. I read few/two books that you did.

This raises the question as to whether the analysis of as-relatives should be extended to
like-relatives, so that ACD is in this case also resolved by movement. This would be a
natural step, having adopting the analysis above for as-relatives, as in (169).
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(169) a. John saw men like Bill did.
b. ||[AP like the ones wh1 that Bill did see k1-like men] 1 John saw k1-like men||

However, there is not much independent evidence for this movement, however, and perhaps these cases of ACD should be handled differently, or perhaps they might lead to
abandoning the movement analysis of ACD altogether. I will leave this for future investigation. In any case, like-relatives appear to behave just like such-as-relatives with respect
to the definiteness effect and ACD.

2.3.4 Summary
In this section, I have argued that like that has a semantics very parallel to such: like
such, like that may only be anteceded by nominals that denote properties that correspond
to kinds, or objects that instantiate kinds, and its relatives (i.e., like-relatives) behave like
they abstract over kinds with respect to the definiteness effect and ACD. These properties
may be accounted for if like varies over individuals, either kinds, or objects that instantiate kinds.

2.4 Pro-AdvPs: Tak and So51
Alongside pro-forms that have the distribution of adjectives, there are also pro-forms that
have the distribution of AdvPs. For instance, the adverbial thus, repeated from (170)
above, appears to have the distribution of an adverb, and to pick up the reference of a
preceding adverb:
51

This material in this section is based in large part on Landman and Morzycki (2003); I am very grateful
to Marcin Morzycki for first pointing out the link between such and these adverbials, and for inspiring and
insightful discussion of this material.
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(170) You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and

AdvP

haughtinessi, and if danced thusi/soi, the dance will be beautiful.

Landman and Morzycki (2003, henceforth, LM) observe that in some languages, there is
a close correspondence between adverbials analogous to English thus, and adnominal
modifiers analogous to English such. As adverbials, these expressions seem to be anaphoric to a manner (see also Kehler and Ward 1999 for a similar adverbial use of so in
English):52

(171) a. Polish
On tańczył tak.
he danced so
‘He danced like that.’

b. German
Er hat so getanzt.
He has so danced
‘He danced like that.

As adnominals, these expressions are analogous to English such:

Thanks to Ania Łubowicz and Marcin Morzycki for the Polish data, and to Jan Anderssen for the German
data.
52
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(172) a. Polish
Taki pies uciekł

wczoraj

w nocy.

such dog

yesterday

in night

ran.away

‘Such a dog ran away last night.’

b. German
So ein Hund ist

lezte Nacht

davongelaufen.

so a dog

last

away-ran.

is

night

‘Such a dog ran away last night.’

As LM point out, these adverbial and adnominal expressions are closely related: they
share the same morphological form (minus inflectional morphology in Polish), and both
are anaphoric. Further, as with English such, they may occur with optional as-phrases.
(173) illustrates this for the adnominal cases, and (174) for the adverbials.
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(173) a. Polish
Taki pies jak ten

uciekł

wczoraj

w nocy.

such dog

ran.away

yesterday

in night

as this

‘Such a dog as this ran away last night.’

b. German
So ein Hund

wie

dieser hat

mal

meinen Bruder gebissen.

so a

as

this

once

my

dog

has

brother bitten.

‘Such a dog as this once bit my brother.’

(174) a. Polish
Jan

tańczył

John danced

tak

jak Maria.

so

as Mary

‘John danced how Mary did.’

b. German
Jan

hat

so

John has thus

wie

Maria getanzt.

as

Mary

danced

‘John danced how Mary did.’

In Polish, the correspondence between adnominal and adverbial uses is also reflected in
the wh-word counterparts of tak/taki:
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(175) a. Jaki
what

pies

uciekł

wczoraj

w nocy?

dog

ran.away yesterday in night

‘What kind of dog ran away last night?’

b. Jak

tańczył

Jan?

how danced

John

‘How did John dance?’

These modifiers, then, share several properties: they are both anaphoric, both take asphrases, and, in Polish, have parallel wh-words.53
LM capture the relation between the adnominal and adverbial uses by analyzing
these modifiers as uniformly kind-anaphoric. As in English, the adnominal cases may be
construed as anaphoric to a kind:54

(176) a. ||takii||g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)]
b. ||soi||g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)]

A similar pattern appears to occur in in Macedoninan (Slavica Kochovska 2004), Korean (Seunghun Lee
2004) and Chinese (Wei Li 2004).
53

54

For taki and so, there is no justification for positing an abstract internal structure, as for such, which I
analyzed as the combination of so and like. Accordingly, I assume here that these expressions are assigned
this semantics, and have no internal structure analogous to such.
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Extending this analysis to the adverbial uses, these too can be taken to be properties of
realizations of a contextually salient kind, in this case, a contextually supplied event-kind
(on event-kinds, see also Hinrichs 1985 and Barwise and Perry 1983):

(177) ||taki||g = [⇧e . e ≤ g(i)]

These modifiers then would combine with the verbs they modify by predicate modification:

(178) ||tańczył taki||g = [⇧e . dance(e) & e ≤ g(i)]

German so and Polish tak can thus be uniformly analyzed as kind-anaphoric in both their
adnominal and adverbial uses, with ‘manner’ modeled as an event-kind.
This analysis raises the question of what exactly the linguistic antecedents for tak
and so are – what expression, if any, corresponds to an event-kind – and whether they are
subject to similar restrictions as were observed for such. There are some clues for determining the linguistic antecedents for these expressions. For example, Marcin Morzycki
(p.c.) points out that examples like the following suggest that manner adverbs – as opposed to full VPs – antecede these adverbials, as indicated by the underlining:

(179) Maria ist auf einem Bein gehüpft und Jan stand so herum.
Maria has on one

foot hopped and Jan stood so around

‘Maria hopped on one foot, and Jan stood around like that.’
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If so were instead assigned the reference of the entire preceding VP, ist auf einem Bein
gehüpft, the wrong result would obtain, as the sentence does not assert that Jan has done
any standing.
Other restrictions on possible antecedents for these expressions also can be observed: Neither temporal nor locative adverbials may (generally) antecede these adverbials, as the examples in (180) illustrate.

(180) a. German
*Maria hat am Dienstag getanzt und Jan hat auch so getanzt.
Maria has on Tuesday danced and Jan has also so danced
‘Maria dance on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’

b. Polish
*Maria tańczyła we wtorek

i

Jan też tak tańczył.

Maria danced on Tuesday and Jan also so danced
‘*Maria danced on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’
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(181) a. German
*Maria hat in Minnesota gegessen und Jan hat auch so gegessen.
Maria has in Minnesota eaten

and Jan has also so eaten

‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’

b. Polish
*Maria jadła w Minnesocie i
Maria ate

Jan też tak jadł.

in Minnesota and Jan also so ate

‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’

Temporal and locative adverbials in general restrict a set of events to having taken place
at a particular time or place in a given world, and as a consequence may not make for a
very good event-kind, similar to the restrictions observed for such.
However, as both Chris Potts (p.c.) and Mark Baker (p.c.) have pointed out, this
restriction may just be due to the fact that there are other lexical items available in these
languages as pro-forms for temporal or locative adverbials, analogous to English then and
there, respectively. The existence of these words plausibly then blocks the use of so and
tak in these cases. It remains unclear, then, what expressions may serve as the linguistic
antecedents of these adverbials, and whether they are restricted in the same way that the
antecedents for such are restricted. There are at least two plausible antecedents: (i) a preceding manner adverb, e.g., clumsily; and (ii) a whole VP, e.g., dancing clumsily (a third
possibility, even, is that both of these expressions are possible as antecedents, as dis-
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cussed in 2.5). I will return to the issue of what may antecede so in the discussion of do
so below.

2.5 Adverbial Like That
This account of adverbial tak and so can be straightforwardly be extended to adverbial
like that, illustrated in (182).

(182) He walks like that.

Here, on analogy with adnominal like that, the like of adverbial like that relates an event
kind and an individual, as in (183), and that in this case is interpreted as a variable ranging over event-kinds, as in (184):

(183) ||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧e . e ≤ k]
(184) ||that||g = g(i)

Combining these two semantically yields a semantics equivalent to that proposed above
for tak and so, repeated as follows:

(185) a. ||takii||g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)]
b. ||soi||g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)]
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It should be noted here, however, that something more would need to be said for examples like he walks like her, where her does not obviously instantiate an event-kind. This
makes for an interesting contrast with the adnominal people like her, where her must instantiate the contextually supplied kind.
Much about the syntax and semantics of like remains unresolved. I have here tried
to show that a line of thought that treats it as anaphoric to a kind seems to account for its
parallels to such and its adverbial analogues.

2.6 The VP Pro-form Do So
With this analysis of such and its adverbial counterparts in hand, it is appealing to consider English do so as another instance of kind-anaphora, taking do so as the semantic
composition of main verb do and the adverbial so (Bouton 1970, building on Ross 1972;
see also Kehler and Ward 1999). In this section, I will sketch an analysis according to
which the English adverbial so that occurs in do so is interpreted just like German so (and
Polish tak): as a set of events that instantiate a variable over event-kinds.55
There are several ways in which do so behaves as if it is the combination of main
verb do and adverbial so. For one, syntactically, the do of do so behaves like a main verb,
as it cannot invert (186), does not escape VP-deletion (187), and cannot occur in tags
(188).

55

Thanks in particular to Chris Potts (p.c.) and Marcin Morzycki (p.c.) for discussion of extending the
analysis of tak and so to English do so.
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(186) a. You did so.
b. Did you do so?
c. *Did you so?

(187) a. You did.
b. *Did you do?
c. Did you?

In addition, do so does not passivize or undergo clefting, suggesting that it is adverbial
(Kehler and Ward 1999):

(188) *…and so was done by Hillary.

(Kehler and Ward 1999)

(189) *It is so which Hillary did.
(190) *What Hillary did was so.

Further support for treating do so as the combination of main verb do and adverbial so comes from data that show that main verb do and do so share certain semantic
properties (Ross 1972). As Ross observes, main verb do independently occurs in the
grammar, in examples like the following:
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(191) Jack did

a study of bat guano.

(Ross 1972)

a report on marshmallows
research on hedonism
a dive from the south bulwark
some snark-hunting

This verb, Ross observes, must take as its complement a nominal that appears to denote
an activity:

(192) *Jack did knowledge of karate.

Like main verb do, do so requires a non-stative antecedent (Lakoff and Ross 1976):

(193) *The coffee is cold, but it didn’t use to do so.

This would be explained if these pro-forms inherited this condition from main verb do,
which can be taken to introduce agentivity (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.):

(194) ||do|| = ⇧x . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x]

Taking the so of do so to have the same semantics as German so and Polish tak, namely,
a property of individuals that instantiate an event-kind, as in (195), do so can then be in-
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terpreted as the semantic composition of do and so, a set of events that instantiate a
contextually salient kind of event, as in (196).

(195) ||soi||g = ⇧e . e ≤ g(i)
(196) ||do soi||g = ⇧x . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x & e ≤ g(i)]

To illustrate the analysis, the instance of do so in (197a) would be interpreted as in
(197b), assuming that g(i) yields the event kind DANCE.

(197) a. Mary dancedi and John did soi, too.
b. ||do soi||g = ⇧x . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x and e ≤ DANCE]

There are some difficulties, though, for this type of account, as do so is less restricted than German so in the types of antecedents it may take. For example, so in German requires a manner as antecedent, as (198) shows, whereas do so does not, as (199)
shows.

(198) German
Maria hat *(elegant und schnell) getanzt und Peter hat auch so

getanzt.

Maria has elegantly and quickly danced and Peter has also so

danced

‘Maria danced *(elegantly and quickly), and Peter danced like that too.’

(199)

Mary danced and John did so, too.
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Further, so may not have a temporal or locative antecedent, as the examples in (200)
show, while do so may, as (201) shows:

(200) a. German
*Maria hat am Dienstag getanzt und Jan hat auch so getanzt.
Maria has on Tuesday danced and Jan has also so danced
‘Maria dance on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’

b. German
*Maria hat in Minnesota gegessen und Jan hat auch so gegessen.
Maria has in Minnesota eaten

and Jan has also so eaten

‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’

(201) a. Maria danced on Tuesday, and Jan did so too.
b. Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan did so too.

In light of these facts, R. Schwarzschild and S. Cumming (p.c.) suggest an account that in
part resolves the issue of what types of linguistic expressions correspond to event-kinds. I
am unsure how the account would be formalized, but an intuitive description of it runs as
follows. They suggest that both manner adverbs as well as whole VPs may provide the
antecedent for adverbial so, and accordingly, both may denote (or at least introduce into
the discourse) event-kinds. So, then, may take one or the other as its antecedent; and
which it takes as antecedent is sometimes forced by the semantic environment in which it
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occurs. For example, in (199) and (201), the so in do so takes as its reference event-kinds
introduced by the preceding italicized VPs. In contrast, in examples when so modifies a
verb other than do, it picks up the reference of a preceding adverbial alone. This pattern
might be explained if every VP may correspond to no more than one core-VP-meaning,
and, main verb do is ‘semantically light’ in not introducing such a meaning. Thus, when
so combines with do, it takes as its antecedent (an event-kind associated with) a whole
VP-meaning, whereas, when it occurs with a verb other than do, it may only be anteceded
by an adverbial.

2.7 Predicative So
There are also examples in which so make substitute for an AP, as in the following example (repeated from (9) above):

(202) I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi.

AP

Although I will not treat predicative so in detail here, I will sketch an account of this expression, according to which it too is construed as related to such. That is, I will extend
the analysis of adverbial so to the predicative AP so.
First, note that predicative AP so also occurs in German:
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(203) Er sagte dass er sich

schlecht fühle, aber er sah

He said that he himself bad

felt,

nicht so aus.

but he looked not so AUS.

“He said that he felt bad, but he didn’t look so.”

The fact that predicative AP so and adverbial so in German are morphologically the same
supports treating them as having the same semantics.
Further, some evidence for interpreting AP so in English in the same way as English adverbial so comes from the observation that in English, AP so seems to have the
same distribution as the phrase that way, suggesting a correspondence between so and
manner adverbials:

(204) I thought she would be happy, but she certainly doesn’t seem so.
(205) I thought she would be happy, but she certainly doesn’t seem that way.

(206) ??That made Julia happy, and it made Frank that way too.
(207) ??That made Julia happy, and it made Frank so too.

This use of so certainly requires further investigation, but these examples suggest that it
too may be part of the same paradigm, so that all of these cases involve anaphora to
kinds, or objects that instantiate kinds.
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2.8 Chapter Summary
Having looked at several plausible candidates for property-anaphors in English, it appears
that there is no strong evidence for treating them in this way. Instead, these seem to be a
class of pro-forms related to such, all of which vary over individuals that are, or instantiate, kinds.
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CHAPTER 3
MOVEMENT AND VARIABLES

3.1 Introduction
The constraint I am proposing, NHTV, has implications for just those cases of movement
that involve abstraction over variables at LF.56,57 In particular, the constraint predicts only
a restricted set of such movement constructions to occur, namely, only those that involve
binding of individual variables. I will argue in this chapter that if we look at the types of
variables that may be abstracted over in A’-movement constructions at LF, NHTV in fact
explains what does and does not occur. Data will come exclusively from English.
To illustrate that some movement constructions have been analyzed as involving
bound variables at LF, consider the restrictive relative clause construction, as illustrated
by the italicized string in (208) (the semantic analysis I will adopt here is based on Quine
1960, Montague 1974, and Partee 1975).

(208) I liked the movie that Lara made __.

I will adopt a syntactic analysis of restrictive relatives according to which they involve
wh-movement (Chomsky 1977), so that (208) is represented at LF by the structure in
(209), in which a non-overt wh-element occupies the Specifier of CP, and a variable oc56

I will only look at instances of A’-movement in this work, and will have to leave for future research other
cases of movement that may involve variables, e.g., A-movement constructions such as Raising.
57

In some frameworks, movement constructions do not involve bound variables at LF – as in a variablefree semantics, for example. Under such frameworks, the constraint would not have any bearing on what
types of movement constructions were possible or impossible. See Section 4.5 for further discussion.
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curs in its original position – that is, in the position of the surface gap, the position following made in (208), represented here as an indexed trace.58

(209)

DP
wo
D
NP
g
wo
the
NP
CP
g
wo
movie
wh1
C’
wo
C
IP
g
3
that
NP
I’
g
3
Lara
I
VP
3
V
DP
g
g
made
t1

Like a pronoun, the indexed trace receives its value from the assignment function – that
is, it is a variable. Further, this variable is bound at the CP level by the moved whoperator, which introduces lambda abstraction, given the Predicate Abstraction rule given
in Chapter 1. In effect, the relative clause CP is interpreted as in (210): it is a function
that maps an individual x to true iff Lara made x.

(210) || [CP wh1 that Lara made t1] ||g = ⇧x . Lara made x

58

In (209), I represent the variable syntactically as an indexed trace. However, this is in part for ease of
exposition, as committing to a theory in which gaps are represented as traces at LF is not essential to my
arguments for NHTV; what is essential in (209) is that the gap is treated semantically as a variable.
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In this way, (at least some) restrictive relative clauses – and wh-constructions more generally – have been analyzed as involving bound variables at LF.
I will motivate NHTV by looking at – and for – potential cases of movement constructions in which higher-type variables might be posited, and showing that there is evidence that higher-type variables do not in fact occur. Empirical evidence for this position
will come in two forms. First, higher-type variables have been posited to account for
cases of reconstruction; I will review arguments that have been presented against such
accounts based on binding theory constraints. Second, I will show that NHTV correctly
predicts the absence of certain constructions that would require higher-type variables at
LF. In particular, I will look for cases in which the gap in an A’-construction corresponds
syntactically to a predicative phrase (AP, VP, or AdvP), as these are potential cases in
which higher-type variables might occur. Following work on movement constructions by
several authors, I will argue that many cases of movement of higher-type expressions are
in fact instances of partial or total syntactic reconstruction. In the case of partial reconstruction, what is bound at LF is not a higher-type variable, but rather an individual variable (as in wh-questions such as How tall is she?). In the case of total reconstruction,
there is no variable binding at LF at all (as in topicalization structures such as She said
she would win the election, and win the election, she did).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I will review
arguments that partial reconstruction is necessary for (at least some) cases of pied-piping.
In Section 3.3, I will review two possible analyses of reconstruction, namely, syntactic
and semantic reconstruction, the latter of which appeals to higher-type variables. I will in
this section review arguments against semantic reconstruction. The discussion of recon-

102

struction will pave the way for looking at gaps in A’-constructions that appear to correspond syntactically to higher-type expressions, such as VPs and APs, which are the focus
of Section 3.4: in this section, I will look at (and for) A’-constructions that have gaps
with the syntactic distribution of higher-type expressions: topicalization structures in
3.4.1, and wh-movement in 3.4.2. In Section 3.5, I will briefly discuss variable-free semantic frameworks. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Reconstruction and Pied-piping
Reconstruction refers generally to cases where a moved constituent – or a part thereof –
behaves as if it were interpreted in its unmoved position. Pied-piping in wh-questions, for
example, has been observed to behave this way (Chomsky 1977, Karttunen 1977, Heim
1987, among others). Consider, for example, the contrast in grammaticality between the
following two wh-questions, both of which at least superficially look quite alike, in that
both have gaps that correspond syntactically to a DP, and both of have gaps in the postcopular position of a there-existential (these examples are based on Heim 1987, who in
turn reports the contrast from Safir 1982):59

(211) a. [CP How many soldiers] were there __ at the party (when you got there)?
b. ??[CP Who] was there __ at the party (when you got there)?

Heim (1987) shows the contrast in (211) can be explained given independently motivated
assumptions about both (i) what may occur in the post-copular subject position of a there-

59

The discussion here will follow in large part the discussion of these examples in Heim 1987.
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existential – a position known to be subject to the Definiteness Restriction (Milsark 1974,
1977) – and (ii) how the gap in each of these examples should be interpreted in order to
derive the right interpretations for these questions. Starting with (i), Milsark’s
Definiteness Restriction bars certain nominals – his strong nominals, which include the
definite nominals – from occurring in the post-copular subject position of thereexistentials, to account for the contrast in (212).

(212) a. *There was the soldier at the party.
b. There was a soldier at the party.

Heim posits as an instance of the Definiteness Restriction the constraint in (213), which
prohibits individual variables from occupying the position following there-be, taking individual variables to belong to the strong class of nominals.

(213) *There be x, where x is an individual variable.

(Heim 1987)

Support for (213) comes examples like the following, which show that a bound variable
pronoun may not occur following there be:

(214) a. *Few people admitted that there had been them at the party.
b. *No perfect relationship is such that there is it.
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Further support for (213) comes from the distribution of wh-gaps in there-existentials. In
particular, if (213) holds, it predicts that a gap that is interpreted as an individual variable
should not be permitted in the post-copular position of a there-existential. Heim proposes
that this in fact accounts for the contrast in (211), repeated below.

(211) a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party (when you got there)?
b. ??Who was there __ at the party (when you got there)?

It can be independently argued based on the semantics of these questions that the gap in
(211a) is not solely an individual variable at LF, while the one in (211b) is. For example,
the meaning of (211a) corresponds (roughly) to the paraphrase in (215a): the question
asks, for what degree d, whether there were d-many soldiers at the party. This meaning
can be derived by (roughly) the LF representation in (215b), in which the how manyphrase is taken to comprise two parts, the first consisting of a wh-operator (contributed by
how) and the second x-many N’, construed here as a existential generalized quantifier
which is pied-piped with how in the surface structure representation (Heim 1987, Cresti
1995, Rullmann 1995, Romero 1998, Frampton 1999, Fox 1999.)60

(215) a. For what degree d: there were d-many soldiers at the party.
b. Whd [there were d-many soldiers at the party]
60

For the present discussion, I will assume without argument that this interpretation is derived from an LF
in which the indefinite x-many people syntactically occupies its base position, either by being lowered
(Cinque 1990) or by interpreting its lowest copy (Chomsky 1995). That is, I will assume that part of the
how many-phrase is syntactically reconstructed into its unmoved position (Heim 1987, Lebeaux 1990,
Heycock 1995, Romero 1999, Fox 2000 and others). I will, however, motivate this assumption, and compare it to semantic theories of reconstruction in the next section (Section 2.4).
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Importantly, in order to derive this interpretation, (211a) is interpreted with a narrow
scope occurrence of x-many soldiers. As Heim points out, if x-many soldiers were not
interpreted with narrow-scope with respect to the wh-operator, as in (216b), the sentence
would receive the unwanted interpretation in (216a), which could be answered by, e.g.,
Tom, Bill, and Frank, which intuitively is not an appropriate answer to (211a).

(216) a. For what y such that there is a degree d and y is d-many soldiers:
there was y at the party
b. Why [ d [d-many soldiers(y)]] [there were y at the party]

This explains the well-formedness of (211a), as the gap in this question is not represented
as an individual variable at LF, and thus does not violate the Definiteness Restriction.
(211a) in this way contrasts with the interpretation of who questions like that in (211b),
repeated below, which arguably do have a gap that corresponds to an individual variable
at LF. The result is that (211b) would be assigned an interpretation like that in (217), in
which who is represented as for what person x.61

(211) b. ?Who was there __ at the pary (when you got there)?
(217) Whx: x is a person: there was x at the party

In (217), an individual variable follows there be, which results in ungrammaticality.

61

Heim (1987) suggests that who in some instances may also be interpreted in a way similar to how-many,
and in this case satisfies the Definiteness Restriction. The reader is referred to that work for details.
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To summarize, a surface gap arguably is not always interpreted as an individual
variable at LF, although it may contain one. For example, although how-many-Nquestions and who questions both have DP gaps, they differ with respect to the LF representations of their gaps. For the former, material that is pied-piped in the surface string –
i.e., x-many-N – is interpreted at LF in the position of the gap. For the latter, an individual
variable occupies the position of the gap. This explains why a gap corresponding to a
moved how-many-N phrase may occur in the post-copular subject position of a thereexistential, while a gap corresponding to a moved who phrase may not, assuming Heim’s
there be x constraint in (213).
In this section, I have assumed without argument that these examples are accounted for by syntactic reconstruction. There is, however, an alternative account of these
cases that makes use of higher-type variables to capture the same contrasts, namely semantic reconstruction. In the next section, I will introduce this alternative, and present
arguments that have been given against it, and in favor of syntactic reconstruction.

3.3 Syntactic vs. Semantic Reconstruction
Several analyses have been proposed to account for reconstructed phrases; I will discuss
two competing accounts here, namely, syntactic reconstruction, and semantic reconstruction. Recall from the previous section that how many-questions provide an example of
partial reconstruction, in that part of the moved phrase is reconstructed in the position of
the gap at LF, so that (218a) is assigned an LF like that in (218b).62

62

I follow Elbourne and Sauerland (2002) is using the terms partial reconstruction for a partially reconstructed expression, and total reconstruction (a term they attribute to Aoun and Benmamoun 1998) for a
totally reconstructed expression. My account of reconstruction, however, differs from their own.
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(218) Syntactic reconstruction
a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party?
b. Whd: there were d-many soldiers at the party.

As reflected in (218b), one way of achieving a narrow-scope interpretation of part of the
how-many phrase is to assume that the indefinite d-many people syntactically occupies
the position of the gap that is, the indefinite is syntactically reconstructed (Heim 1987,
Lebeaux 1990, Heycock 1995, Romero 1998, Fox 1999, 2000, among others), either by
being lowered (Cinque 1990) or by interpreting its lowest copy (Chomsky 1995). However, there is an alternative – and semantically equivalent – way of achieving this narrowscope interpretation, according to which no material is syntactically reconstructed in the
position of the gap at LF. Instead, the desired interpretation can also be achieved by assigning to the surface gap a higher-type variable at LF; this account is referred to as semantic reconstruction (Engdahl 1986, Chierchia 1995, Cresti 1995, Rullman 1995, Romero 1998, Sternefeld 1997, 2001, Sharvit 1997). By this account, representing the surface gap at LF with a variable of the same type as the expression x-many-soldiers – here,
type <<e,t>, t> – makes it possible to interpret this constituent as if it occupied that position syntactically. For example, interpreting the gap in (219a) as a variable of type
<<e, t>, t>, as in (219b), produces the same semantic result as syntactically reconstructing x-many soldiers in its base position:
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(219) Semantic reconstruction
a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party?
b. Whd [d-many soldiers [⇧f<<e,t>,t>. there were f<<e,t>,t> at the party]]

By abstracting over a variable of the same type as d-many soldiers, the constituent is interpreted as if it were in its base position.
Authors have since debated about whether there is any evidence for syntactic versus semantic reconstruction. In particular, evidence from sensitivity to LF constraints –
binding theory constraints, in particular, assuming that these are structural constraints that
hold at LF – have been used to determine the LF position of a reconstructed phrase (Lebeaux 1991, Heycock 1995, Sportiche 1996, 2001, Romero 1998, Fox 1999, 2000 and
others).63 For example, consider the following contrast (based on Romero 1998):64

(220) a. *[How many pictures of John1] did he1 buy __?
b. [How many pictures of himself1] did John1 buy __?

Given the surface syntactic configurations of these examples, these judgments are surprising given the definitions of Principles C and A in (221) and (222).

63

Alternative accounts of binding phenomena have been proposed, in particular that of Reinhart (1983),
which does not depend on structural configurations. Sharvit (1999) and Sternefeld (2001) in fact argue that
the contrasts presented here may be accounted for on a semantic reconstruction account, given this construal of binding (namely, a preference for variable binding over coreference).
64

The lack Principle A violations in the examples at hand may be the result of the reflexives being logophoric, and thus not subject to Principle A (as Heycock 1995 points out, based on Reinhart and Reuland
1993). If so, then these examples would not provide support for syntactic reconstruction. See, however, Fox
and Nissembaum 2004 for evidence (not presented here) that Principle A can in fact be used to motivate
syntactic reconstruction.
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(221) Principle C: An r-expression cannot be c-commanded by a co-referring
expression.

(222) Principle A: An anaphor must be c-commanded by its binder.

For example, the surface syntax of (220a) does not violate Principle C, as John, an rexpression, is not c-commanded by the co-referential he (and thus this example would
need to be ruled out on other grounds). Similarly, the surface syntax of (220b) does not
satisfy Principle A, as himself is not c-commanded by its binder, John. These peculiar
judgments can, however, be explained if the pied-piped portion of the moved how-many
phrase – in this case, x-many pictures – is syntactically reconstructed at LF:

(223) a. Whx [he1 bought x-many pictures of John1]
b. Whx [John1 bought x-many pictures of himself1]

In these examples, Principles C and A are satisfied, respectively. In effect, these examples behave like their declarative counterparts (substituting that for how):

(224) a. *He1 bought that many pictures of John1.
b. John1 bought that many pictures of himself1.

(224a), like (223a), violates Principle C, while (224b), like (223b), satisfies Principle A.
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A similar contrast comes from variable binding examples, as in (225) (thanks to
Henry Davis, p.c., for bringing these examples to my attention).

(225) a. *[How many pictures of [each woman]1 ] did she1 buy?
b. [How many pictures of herself1] did [each woman]1 buy?

Assuming that a variable binder must c-command variables it binds at LF, these grammaticality judgments are expected if these questions are assigned the LFs in (226), in
which the x-many N constituent is syntactically reconstructed:

(226) a. Whx [she1 bought x-many pictures of [each woman]1 ]
b. Whx [[each woman]1 bought x-many pictures of herself1 ]

In (226a), each woman does not c-command she, while in (226b), it does.
To sum up so far, Principles C and A – assuming that these principles are structural constraints that hold at LF – provide evidence for syntactic reconstruction for howmany questions, and against semantic reconstruction. I will adopt this account of reconstruction here, and thus do not see how-many questions as posing a counterexample to
NHTV.
In addition to how-many-questions, other constructions have also been analyzed
as instances of reconstruction. Interestingly, based on Principle C effects, several authors
have argued that just those expressions that would require higher-type traces to semantically reconstruct in fact obligatorily syntactically reconstruct at LF (see Heycock 1995,
Fox 1999; based on data from Cinque 1990; see also Beck 1996 in the context of how
111

many questions). In the next section, I will consider other cases of reconstruction in the
context of non-nominal gaps.

3.4 Non-Nominal Gaps in A’-Constructions
I turn now to motivation that NHTV holds for A’-Movement. My main strategy will be to
look for gaps in A’-constructions that correspond to higher-type expressions, in particular, VPs, APs, and AdvPs. These present potential cases in which higher-type variables
would be used to interpret the gaps in these structures. In Section 3.4.1, I will look at
topicalization, and in Section 3.4.2, at wh-movement.

3.4.1 Topicalization
Gaps corresponding to both VPs and APs may occur in topicalization structures, as (227)
illustrates.

(227) a. …and [VP win the election], Terry did __.
b. …and [AP angry], Martha became __.

VP
AP

These structures, like how-many questions, have been analyzed as cases of reconstruction, and here too, both syntactic and semantic reconstruction have been proposed. By the
former account, the gaps in these structures may be syntactically reconstructed at LF, as
in (228) (see Cinque 1984, Barss 1986, 1987, Huang 1993, Heycock 1995).
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(228) a. Terry did [VP win the election]
b. Martha became [AP angry]

The alternative is to construct an LF in which the gap is interpreted as a variable of the
same type as the moved constituents, with the result that they are interpreted as if in their
unmoved position (see von Stechow 1991, Bittner 1994):65

(229) a.
b.

[VP win the election] [ ⇧f<e, t> . Terry did f<e, t> ]
[AP angry] [ ⇧f<e, t> . Martha became f<e, t> ]

Note that this case differs from the how-many cases discussed in the previous section in
that here the whole constituent is reconstructed in its original position, that is, these are
instances of total reconstruction; I flag this here because it will be relevant below for
looking at wh-questions with predicative gaps, where total reconstruction is not possible
(see discussion below).
Based on Principle C effects, several authors have argued that topicalized predicates obligatorily syntactically reconstruct at LF (Cinque 1984; Barss 1986, 1988; Huang
65

A third possibility is that these constructions involve abstraction over a nominalized individual, as suggested in Potts (2002b), so that (i) is assigned the LF in (ii):
(i)
(ii)

Win the election, Terry did __.
[VP Win the election] 1 Terry did t1.

By this account, the moved VP would denote a nominalized property, and the variable abstracted over
would range over nominalized properties. Potts supports this account with the observation that moved predicates may extract out of weak islands:
(iii)

Win the election, Terry wondered whether he would __.

If only individual-denoting phrases may extract, then this example can be taken as evidence for the LF in
(ii). See further discussion in Section 3.4.3.
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1993; Heycock 1995). Assuming that Principle C is a syntactic condition holding at LF,
the constraint has been used to determine the LF position of the moved predicate (Lebeaux 1990, Heycock 1995, and others). Consider, for example, the following contrast:

(230) [DP Those allegations about Johni], I think hei will deny __.
(231) *[VP Cry out for Maryi’s brother], I think shei did __.

In both of these examples, a phrase that contains an R-expression is moved out of a configuration in which Principle C would be violated, as examples in which these phrases are
not moved illustrate:

(232) *I think hei will deny [DP those allegations about Johni].
(233) *I think shei [VP cried out for Maryi’s brother].

The contrast between the sentences in (230) and those in (231), can be explained if
moved APs and VPs – that is, moved predicates – obligatorily reconstruct at LF. As (233)
shows, this would result in a Principle C violation. In contrast, in (230), the moved constituent leaves an individual trace, and thus may be interpreted in its moved position,
where it does not violate Principle C. Just this state of affairs is predicted if higher-type
traces are disallowed, as NHTV dictates.
To summarize, evidence from Principle C suggests that topicalization structures
are instances of syntactic reconstruction, and thus do not involve higher-type variables.
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3.4.2 Wh-Movement
In this section, I will look at constructions in which wh-gaps correspond to expressions
that are commonly taken to be of a higher-type, in particular, VPs, APs, and AdvPs. For
each type of syntactic constituent, I will look at their behavior in three wh-constructions:
wh-questions, restrictive relatives, and pseudo-clefts. I postpone looking at their behavior
in non-restrictive relatives and as-appositives to Section 3.5.

3.4.2.1 VP Gaps in Wh-Constructions
In English, wh-gaps with the distribution of VPs are not possible in wh-questions,
pseudo-clefts, or restrictive relatives. Consider for example, the ungrammatical whquestion in (234b), which has a gap with the distribution of a VP, as comparison with
(234a) shows.

(234) a. I saw Mary [VP wash the dishes].
b. *What did you see Mary __?
c. What did you see Mary do __?

The ungrammaticality of (234b) indicates that the gap in a wh-question cannot have the
distribution of a full VP. Instead, to form a wh-question for a VP, examples like (234c)
are used, which appears to be a nominal wh-phrase combined with main verb do, analogous to expressions like do so or do that discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, VP gaps do
not occur in pseudo-cleft constructions, as (234a) shows; instead, here too, (234b) is
used, in which main verb do occurs with a nominal gap.
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(235) a. *What I saw Mary __ was wash the dishes.
b. What I saw Mary do __ was wash the dishes.

The situation is similar for restrictive relative clauses, in which VP gaps are also absent,
as (236a) shows (however, see discussion immediately below on what such constructions
might mean, and where they would occur in the syntax); (236a) contrasts with (236b), in
which main verb do occurs.

(236) a. *[CP wh that I made Mary __ ]
b. The typing [CP wh that I made Mary do __ ] was sloppy.

The absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with VP gaps can be explained by
NHTV. Unlike with topicalization, total reconstruction for these examples is not possible:
as Sauerland and Elbourne (2004) point out, total reconstruction for wh-questions is not
possible because the wh-operator in these constructions would otherwise be a vacuous
binder. Partial reconstruction is as a result required for wh-constructions (as opposed to
topicalization, for example). Since these constructions require abstraction over a variable,
and since VP meanings are usually taken to be properties of individuals, the result would
be abstraction over properties. This, I am claiming, is the reason for the ungrammaticality
of the (a) cases in (12)-(236) above. In order to avoid abstraction over higher-type variables, the form do what is used instead, which makes possible abstraction over individual
variables – in particular, over variables that range over individuals that correspond to
nominalized properties. Support for viewing the variable as ranging over individuals that
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correspond to nominalized properties comes from the contrast between grammaticality of
(236b) above, and the ungrammaticality of (237) below: the relative clause that I saw her
do is grammatical only if it modifies a nominal property, e,g, in (236b). This relative
clause cannot modify a verb, as (237) shows.66

(237) *Mary typed [CP wh that I made her do __ ].

There is, apparently, a sortal clash in (237), as the CP denotes a set of nominalzed individuals. This supports the conclusion that the variable in this construction is itself a variable over individuals that correspond to nominalized properties.
Returning to the hypothetical, but non-occurring case of a restrictive relative
clause with a property-type gap, it is worth spelling out just what the semantics of such a
constituent would be, if it were to exist. This can be illustrated by building up the semantics of this constituent step by step. Consider, for example, the LF fragment in (238),
which has a VP gap:

66

There may independent factors that rule out VP relatives. Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.), for example, suggests that
it may be the case that relative clauses must adjoin to NPs, and that this independently rules out examples
like (237), repeated as (i) below.
(i)

*Mary typed [CP wh that I saw her do __ ].
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(238)

CP
wo
wh1
C’
wo
C
IP
g
wo
that
NP
I’
g
wo
I
I
VP
wo
V
VP
g
wo
saw
NP
VP
g
6
her2
t1

Construing the trace as a variable over properties would yield a denotation for the above
tree as in (239), in which there is abstraction over a variable over verb meanings.

(239) [⇧f<e, t> . I saw Mary f<e, t>]

This property would be a highly-typed modifier: a set of sets, i.e., type <<e, t>, t>. This
type of modifier would not be appropriate for an <e, t>-type predicate, but rather would
be fit for, e.g., a generalized quantifier, as it would provide a restriction on just this sort
of expression, i.e., the characteristic function of a set of sets. This might very well explain
in part why modifiers with VP gaps do no occur.

3.4.2.2 AP Gaps in Wh-Constructions
The situation with respect to AP gaps is a bit more complicated than that with VPs, so I
will discuss each case in turn.
118

Starting with wh-questions, there are at least two types of AP gaps possible in
English, as (240) and (241) illustrate.

(240) a. Mary is that tall.
b. How tall is Mary __?

(241) a. May looks sick.
b. How does Mary look __?

These questions differ in that first arguably is a case of pied-piping, and involves reconstruction – as was the case for how many-questions above – while the second is not. That
the first involves reconstruction can be argued on similar grounds as was argued for how
many questions. That is, the meaning of (240) may be paraphrased as in (242a), in which
case it the question asks for a degree. It does not have the meaning in (242b), in which it
asks for a predicate; if it did, we would expect that about six-feet would be an inappropriate answer to (240a), which it is not.

(242) a. For what d: Mary is d-tall.
b. For what f<e, t> such that there is a degree d and f is d-tall:
Mary is f<e, t>
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To derive the interpretation in (242a), the question may be associated with the LF in
(243), in which the pied-piped material, d-tall, is syntactically reconstructed in its original position, and what is abstracted over at LF is a degree argument.

(243) Whd [Mary is d-tall]

Given this LF, the question does not involve higher-type variables at LF: even though its
gap corresponds syntactically to an AP, the variable bound at LF is one that ranges over
degrees. It should be noted, however, in addition to (b), semantic reconstruction would
produce the same interpretation:

(244) Whd [Mary is d-tall]

There is no evidence from Principle C in this case against semantic reconstruction, so although it is possible to show that (244) can be interpreted without appealing to highertype variables, there is no evidence that semantic reconstruction is not an option in this
case. To motivate syntactic reconstruction in this, one could perhaps just assume that
these cases work like the how-many cases.
I turn now to the second type of AP question, as in (245), repeated below.

(241) a. Mary looks sick.
b. How does Mary look __?
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This case, unlike (241), does not ask for a degree, but rather a predicate. I want to propose, however, that the gap in these cases is not a predicate, but rather has the same semantics as that of the expression that way. I suggest this because there appears to be a
correlation between the grammaticality of that way, and the possibility of an AP gap.
Consider, for example, the following paradigm:

(245) a. Mary looks sad.
b. Mary looks that way.
c. How does Mary look __?

(246) a. Mary feel sad.
b. Mary feels that way.
c. How does Mary feel __?

(247) a. Marc made Mary sad.
b. ??Marc made Mary that way.
c. ??How did Marc make Mary?

(248) a. Marc found Mary drunk.
b. Marc found Mary that way.
c. How did Marc find Mary?
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These data suggest that these how questions ma be analyzed as adverbial questions, the
wh-counterparts to the adverbial pro-form, so. As a consequence, how-questions involve
abstraction over kinds, just as so ranges over kinds (see further discussion of the semantics of adverbial gaps in the next section). That AP gaps are not otherwise possible in whconstructions is supported by their non-occurrence in restrictive relatives, as (249a) illustrates, and psuedoclefts, as (249b) illustrates.

(249) a. *[CP whi I made Mary ti]
b. ?What I made Mary was angry.

As with VP gaps, the absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with AP gaps is expected given NHTV, since these constructions would require abstraction over AP meanings, usually taken to be properties of individuals.

3.4.2.3 Adverbial Gaps in Wh-Constructions
The ungrammaticality of AP and VP gaps is not obviously due to an alternative restriction that only syntactically nominal expressions may wh-move, as the wh-words where,
when, and how in the wh-questions in (13) and free relatives in (14) are not obviously
nominal, and yet are well-formed:

(250) a. Wherei did you put the keys __?
b. Wheni did you arrive __?
c. Howi did you travel __?
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(251) a. Matthew works [CP wherei you work __ ].
b. Matthew laughs [CP wheni you laugh __ ].
c. Matthew sings [CP howi you sing __ ].

Wh-movement of these particular adverbials is possible because they produce structures
in which there is abstraction over individuals: locations in (13a) and (14a), times in (13b)
and (14b), and event-kinds (following Landman and Morzycki 2003) in (13c) and (14c).67

3.4.3 Non-Restrictive Relatives
Given that VP gaps are ungrammatical in wh-questions, restrictive relative clauses, and
pseudo-clefts, it is somewhat surprising that they do occur in non-restrictive whichrelatives (henceforth, which-relatives), as (252a) illustrates (Jespersen 1965, Sells 1985,
Hardt 1993, 1999, Potts 2002a, 2002b); examples are based on Jespersen 1965, via Sells
1985). AP gaps may also occur in NRRs, as (252b) shows.68

(252) Which-relatives
a. I can make words, which you cannot __.

VP

b. ?It made her feel sick, which it made me feel __ too.

AP

67

Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) asks what the status of why is. I believe that this case also may be taken to involve individuals, with why gaps varying over the same type of individual that expressions like the reason
denotes.
68

Stowell and Potts present examples like (i) below as cases of AP gaps; these examples seem better
judged than those above, however, I have chosen these particular ones because it makes it clear that we are
not dealing with VP gaps, assuming that the auxiliary be moves up to I.
(i)

He is tired, which she [IP [I is] [VP __]] too.
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Similar examples are provided by as-appositives, which also permit VP and AP gaps, as
(253) illustrates (examples based on Stowell 1987 and Potts 2002a, 2002b).

(253) As-appositives
a. She seemed happy, just as Theobald did __.

VP

b. ?It made her feel sick, as it made me feel __ too.

AP

The question that arises, then, is the following: why are VP (and AP) gaps are permitted
in non-restrictive relatives and as-appositives, but disallowed in wh-questions, whrelatives, and clefts? Recall that in Section 3.4.2.1, I explained the absence of VP gaps in
the latter three constructions as due to NHTV: such constructions necessarily involve whbinding, and are ruled out because they would require higher-type variables, construing
APs and VPs as properties. Given that VP and AP gaps are possible in which-relatives
and as-appositives, then, it seems that one faces (at least) three possible explanations for
these facts: (i) which-relatives and as-appositives do not involve movement, (ii) both
which-relatives and as-appositives involve abstraction over individuals (contra Potts
2002a,b), or (iii) NHTV does not hold for movement constructions. I will suggest here
that it is (ii) that explains the grammaticality of AP and VP gaps in as-appositives, that is,
both of these constructions involve abstraction over individual variables. This is a departure from the analysis of Potts (2002a,b), who argues that which-relatives and asappositives differ in the semantic type of their gaps, and so I will review his arguments
for that position in the following, to make clear the consequences of departing from his
analysis of these constructions. I will argue that his conclusion that these constructions
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differ in the semantic types of their gaps is not a necessary one, given the data he presents.
As a first point, it should be established that which-relatives and as-appositives
truly involve wh-movement, as one potential explanation for the difference in the behavior of these two constructions on the one hand, and wh-questions, restrictive relatives, and
pseudo-clefts on the other, would be that the gaps in the former are not instances of whmovement, but rather, ellipsis. Potts (2002a,b) – building on the work of Stowell (1987) –
argues that they do, by showing that these constructions do not display properties of ellipsis, but do show properties of movement. More specifically, Potts (2002b), following
Stowell (1987), takes the gaps in as-appositives and which-relatives to be produced by
wh-movement, so that the as-appositive in (254a) is assigned the structure in (255b), in
which a wh operator occupies the specifier of the CP complement of as, which is analyzed as a preposition, and the which-relative in (255a) is assigned the structure in (255b)
(based on Potts 2002a), in which a wh-operator occupies the specifier of the CP:

(254) a. Ames stole important documents, as the FBI said he had __ .
b. [PP [P as] [CP wh1 the FBI said he had t1]]

(255) a. Ames stole important documents, which the FBI said he had __ .
b. [CP which1 the FBI said he had t1]

Potts supports this analysis by showing that although as may be separated from the gap
by more than a single clause, as (256) shows (example based on Potts 2002b), as may not
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be separated from the gap by a syntactic island (as I will show in the following paragraphs). He presents the examples in (257) - (260), which show that as-appositives are
sensitive to island boundaries (Potts attributes the original observation to Ross 1973; see
also McCloskey 1989, Lapointe 1991, Postal 1997). The (a) examples involve CP-as, the
(b) examples Predicate-As:

(256) a. James left early, just as I thought he might __.
b. James left early, which I thought he might __.

(257) Relative Clause Island
a. The earth is round, just as we (*spoke with someone who) claimed __.
b. John left the country, just as we (*know someone else who) will __.

(258) Adjunct Island
a. Jim sells cars, as (*they smiled politely when) Bill announced __ last night.
b. Jim couldn’t stop laughing, just as (*they smiled politely when) Bill couldn’t
__ last night.

(259) Subject Island
a. *The earth is round, just as his announcing __ made everyone giggle.
b. *He sells cars, just as his announcing he does __ made everyone giggle.
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(260) Complex DP Island
a. The earth is round, as (*we made the claim that) everyone knows __.
b. He felt happy, as (*we made the claim that) he should __.

The same pattern holds for which-relatives, which also do not permit which to be separated from the gap by an island boundary:69

(261) Relative Clause Island
a. The earth is round, which we (*spoke with someone who) claimed __.
b. He left early, which we (*saw someone who) did __ too.

(262) Adjunct Island
a. Jim sells cars, which (*they smiled when) Bill announced __ last night.
b. Jim couldn’t stop laughing, which (*they smiled when) Bill couldn’t __ either.

(263) Subject Island
a. The earth is round, which (* his claiming) __ made everyone giggle.
b. He left early, which (* his claiming we did) __ made everyone giggle.

69

As Potts points out, additional evidence that which-relatives involve movement comes from examples
like (i), which show that which may pied-pipe a preposition; this can be taken to be diagnostic of whmovement (see also Stowell 1987):
(i)

a.
b.

The earth is round, which we are well are of __.
The earth is round, of which we are well aware __.
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(264) Complex DP Island
a. The earth is round, which (*we made the claim that) everyone knows __.
b. He felt happy, which (*we made the claim that) he should __ more often.

As Potts points out, island sensitivity makes these constructions unlike VP Ellipsis, which
is insensitive to islands, as the examples in (265) - (268) illustrate; this supports the conclusion that the gaps in as-appositives and which-relatives are the product of movement.

(265) Relative Clause Island
John left the country, and we know someone else who will __ too.

(266) Adjunct Island
Jim couldn’t stop laughing, and they smiled when Bill couldn’t __ either.

(267) Subject Island
He left early, and his claiming we did __ too made everyong giggle.

(268) Complex DP Island
He felt happy, and we made the claim that he should __ more often.
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In sum, both which-relatives and as-appositives – unlike ellipsis – obey island constraints, and this motivates the conclusion that there is wh-movement internal to these
clauses.70
Having established that the gaps in these constructions are due to movement, I
turn now to the interpretation of these gaps. Potts (2002a) argues that which-relatives
have individual-denoting gaps, while as-appositives have higher-type gaps (I abstract
away here from the external semantics of these constructions, which does not matter for
my purposes here.)71 Potts argues that treating the gaps in non-restrictive relatives as individual variables, and as-appositives as having higher-order variables accounts for certain differences in their behavior. I will ultimately conclude that this is not a necessary
conclusion, however, given his arguments. He provides three arguments for this position,
which I will review in turn.
First, Potts follows Stowell (1987) and Postal (1994), in claiming that the constructions differ in the syntactic type of their gaps. In particular, these authors show that
the gap in a which-relatives has the distribution of a DP, while the gap in an as-appositive
has the distribution of a CP. Evidence comes from examples which show that the gap in a
which-relative may only occur where a DP can, and, similarly, the gap in an as-appositive
may only occur where a CP can. For example, (269) shows that the gap in a which-

70

It should be noted, however, that German and Spanish, which do not permit VP ellipsis at all, also do not
permit VP gaps in which-relatives and as-appostives, but instead only permit a VP pro-form. This suggests
a possible correlation between the acceptability of VP ellipsis in a language, and the possibility of having
VP gaps in non-restrictive clauses.
71

Sells’ (1985) analysis of which-relatives is similar to that of Potts (2002a,b) in that Sells analyzes which
as a variable over individuals: by Sells’ analysis, which is a pronoun just like the pronoun it, only it ranges
over nominalized properties (Sells adopts Chierchia’s (1984) proposal that VPs and APs may correspond to
individuals, as well as properties.) Interestingly, Sells claims that the antecedents for which correspond to
those syntactic categories that denote individuals, and he concludes that “…[which] anaphora gives us clues
as to what individuals we should posit in our semantic representation” [p. 305].
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relative behaves like a DP, in requiring the presence of of when occurring as the argument of the adjective aware.

(269) a. We are well aware (*of) that the earth is round.
b. The earth is round, as we are well aware (*of).
d. *The earth is round, of as we are well aware.

The gaps in as-appositives show the opposite behavior, as (270) shows: these examples
show that the gap in an as-appositive may not occur with of.

(270) a. We are well aware *(of) the fact that the earth is round.
b. The earth is round, which we are well aware *(of).
d. The earth is round, of which we are well aware.

The same pattern occurs with respect to the complement of verbs like boast and comment
(Postal 1994), which do not allow DP complements, but instead require CP complements,
as (271) shows.

(271) a. *Albert boasted/commented/complained that.
b. Albert boasted/commented/complained that the results were fantastic.

Correspondingly, these verbs permit as-appositive gaps in their object position, but not
which-relative gaps (Postal 1994):
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(272) a. ??The results were fantastic, which Albert boasted/commented/complained.
b. The results were fantastic, as Albert boasted/commented/complained.

Stowell (1987) also supports the contrast between which-relatives and as-appositives using raising verbs, which also take CP, but not DP complements, as the following examples show:

(273) a. It appears (*a fact) that the earth really is round.
b. The earth is round, {as/*which} it appears.

Potts, assuming a close connection between syntactic category and semantic type, takes
the difference in syntactic gap to indicate a difference in semantic type of the gaps. He
proposes that which-relatives have individual-denoting variable, while as-appositives
have gaps corresponding to propositions, construed as properties of worlds. He then extends this analysis to cases in which which-relatives have VP or AP gaps, as in (252), repeated from above. That is, the gaps in these examples, he claims, also are represented at
LF as individual variables, in particular, individuals that correspond to nominalized properties.

(252) Non-Restrictive Relatives
a. I can make words, which you cannot __.

VP

b. ?It made her feel sick, which it made me feel __ too.

AP
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However, the conclusion is somewhat puzzling, given that there is no evidence for these
cases that the gaps here are syntactically nominal. If anything, it seems that they are not,
since nominals of course may not occur where a VP occurs:

(274) Non-Restrictive Relatives
a. *I can make words, and you cannot that.

VP

b. *It made her feel sick, and it made me feel that too.

AP

I conclude that the argument that syntactic category determines semantic type is not a
particularly strong one here. Both which-relatives and as-appositives may be taken to involve abstraction over individuals.
The second argument Potts presents comes from the behavior of as-appositives
and which-relatives with respect to extraction of out weak islands. The main observation
is that the wh-operator in an as-appositive may not move out of a weak island, while
which may (based on Ross 1984):

(275) a. ?He was a spy, which they asked whether we knew __.
b. *He was a spy, as they asked whether we knew __.

Potts points out that this contrast can be explained given his assumptions about the semantic types of the gaps in these constructions, in conjunction with the assumption that
only individual-level phrases may escape islands, as has been proposed by in work by
Cinque (1990), Frampton (1991), and Cresti (1995). However, as Szabolcsi (1998, 2002)
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discusses in detail, there are several types of data that are not amenable to the claim that
only individual-level phrases may escape islands. Given that the status of the generalization is not clear at this time, I do not take the data in (275) as indicative of the semantic
type of the gap in which-relatives and as-appositives.
To summarize, Potts argues that which-relatives have individual-denoting variables, while as-appositives have higher-order gaps, based on the syntactic distribution of
their gaps, and the possibility of extraction out of weak islands. I am not convinced, however, that these arguments show conclusively that the gap in an as-appositive differs in
semantic type from that of a which-clause, and in particular, that his arguments show that
as-appositives necessarily have higher-order gaps.
However, as Potts (p.c.), points out, if these arguments do go through, one conclusion that might be made is that NHTV does not in face hold for instances of movement. This would require a conception of movement according to which it does not involve variables. I will briefly discuss this possibility in the final section of this chapter.

3.5 Variable-Free Semantics
In light of the behavior of non-restrictive relatives and as-parentheticals, one route to take
would be to give up the assumption that movement structures are interpreted as involving
abstraction over variables. This has been argued for in variable-free frameworks (Jacobson, Szabolcsi 1989, among others). Giving up the treatment of gaps as variables would
be one way to account for the differences between which-relatives and as-appositives discussed in the previous section. By shifting the focus away from movement and binding,
the constraint would fall to free variables or their equivalents in a variable-free system. It
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would then be possible to say that NHTV is actually about what kinds of context dependency we find in natural language.
Taking this route, however, would also mean giving up any explanation of why
VP and AP gaps are not possible in certain wh-constructions (as argued in Section 3.4.2),
as NHTV would not apply to movement constructions. Further, it would mean giving up
what appears to be the same constraint applying to both movement, as well as pro-forms
(namely, NHTV).

3.6 Chapter Summary
According to NHTV, gaps produced by movement involve variables of a type no higher
than that of an individual. I have argued that this is the case in English based on (i) reconstruction, and (ii) possible gaps in A’-movement constructions. In particular, where total
reconstruction is possible – as in topicalization structures – VP and AP gaps are possible
because these structures involve no variables at all. In contrast, where partial reconstruction is necessary – as in wh-questions – we find abstraction over individuals that correspond the properties, as in the case of VP questions and AP questions and adverbial questions.
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CHAPTER 4
ELLIPSIS AND VARIABLES

4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I focused on the interpretation of gaps produced by movement; in
this chapter, I will focus on the interpretation of gaps of a different nature: those that are
cases of ellipsis. In particular, I will look at ellipses that have the distribution of VPs or
NPs, as illustrated in the following examples (where Ø represents an elided phrase, and
underlining signifies co-reference):

(276) If Jane leaves, Bill will Ø too.

VP

(277) I’ll wash these dishes if you wash those Ø.

NP

Approaches to the interpretation of VP and NP ellipsis fall into at least two camps:72
those that posit fully articulated syntactic structure for the elided phrase at LF (see, e.g.,
Wasow 1972, Sag 1976, Williams 1977, Hankamer 1979, Haik 1987, Tancredi 1992,
Chomsky and Lasnik 1993, Fiengo and May 1994, Wilder 1995, Romero 1998, Fox
2000, Kennedy and Merchant 2000, Merchant 2001, 2005, Kennedy 2003, Goldberg
2005, Frazier and Clifton 2005, Elbourne 2005, among others) and those that treat the
ellipsis as a variable – a higher-type variable, assuming that VPs and NPs are interpreted
as properties – and thus on a par with pronouns such as him (see, e.g., Bach 1977, 1979,
72

Many of these analyses concentrate on VP ellipsis; whether NP ellipsis should be interpreted just like VP
ellipsis remains an open issue, but seems to be assumed in, e.g., Merchant 2001 and Johnson 2004 (both
building on Lobeck (1995), as well as Elbourne 2005. See Section 4.3 for further discussion of the interpretation of NP ellipsis.
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Bach and Partee 1980, Rooth 1981, Partee and Bach 1984, Klein 1987, Dalrymple et al.
1991, Jacobson 1992, Kehler 1993, Hardt 1993, 1999, Hendriks and de Hoop 2001,
among others).73 I will refer to the former type of account as the deletion account, and the
latter type as the pro-form account.74 Clearly, my constraint supports the deletion account,
but not the pro-form account. The question, then, is whether a case can independently be
made for one account over the other.
There is a long-standing debate, however, over which of these accounts is superior on theoretical and empirical grounds, as both accounts enjoy a good measure of empirical success, and both accounts face empirical problems that the other does not (see,
e.g., comparison of the two accounts in Kennedy 2003, Johnson 2001, Hardt 1993). My
aim in this chapter, as a result, will not be to try to resolve this debate, but rather to show
that a deletion view of ellipsis is a viable possibility, and to make clear the consequences
– both good and bad – of adopting such a view of ellipsis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, I will review
the deletion view of ellipsis, that is, the view of VP ellipsis by which it is represented at
LF as a fully syntactically articulated VP, as illustrated in (278), where the strikethrough
font designates unpronounced syntactic structure.

(278) Whenever Jane laughs, Bill does laugh too.

73

There are actually two variants under this first approach: the first generates the elided VP with fully articulated syntactic structure, which is at some point deleted or not pronounced (see, e.g., Tancredi 1992,
Fox 2000, Merchant 2001, among others), and the second generates the elided VP as an empty node, which
at LF is interpreted by copying an antecedent VP (see, e.g., Wasow 1972, Williams 1977, Lobeck 1995,
among others). The differences between these two variants of the first approach will not matter here.
74

I call the first type of account the “deletion account” for lack of a better name; as noted in footnote 2,
however, there are two versions of the this account, one of which involves not deletion but copying. I treat
both as the same here, as both involve a fully articulated representation of a VP at LF.
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In this section, I will review empirical arguments for this view of ellipsis, and address in
particular one major argument against it, that presented by so-called sloppy readings of
VP ellipsis (Hardt 1997, Schwarz 2000). I will conclude from a brief review of these examples that how best to account for them is still up for debate, given that there are currently multiple competing accounts of these examples (e.g., Tomioka, to appear, Elbourne 2005), at least one of which does not make use of higher-type variables (namely,
Elbourne 2005).
In Section 4.2, I will look at NP Ellipsis and one-anaphora. I will adopt the deletion account for NP Ellipsis, so that it has internal syntactic structure like that of an overt
NP, as in (279).

(279) I’ll wash these dishes if you wash those dishes.

Further, following Llombart-Huesca (2002), I will argue that one-anaphora is an instance
of NP Ellipsis, with one a Num head that immediately precedes an elided NP. For example, the DP the little ones in (280) is represented syntactically as in (281).
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(280) I’ll wash the big dishes if you wash the little ones.
(281)

DP
wo
D
NumP
g
wo
the
AP
NumP
g
3
little
Num
NP
g
g
ones
dishes

By this analysis, one(s)-anaphora is not a counterexample to NHTV.

4.2 VP Ellipsis
NHTV supports the deletion view of ellipsis, that is, an analysis of VP Ellipsis by which
it is represented at LF as a fully syntactically articulated VP, as illustrated in (282).

(282) Whenever Jane laughs, Bill does laugh too.

An alternative analysis – at odds with NHTV – views VP Ellipsis as a variable; this can
be represented by the LF in (283), in which ∆ represents a property variable, i.e., a variable over VP meanings.

(283) Whenever Jane laughs1, Bill does ∆ 1 too.

Researchers have long sought to resolve which of these analyses better accounts for the
behavior of VP ellipses, and good arguments for both accounts have surfaced. Evidence
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for the deletion account, for example, comes from examples that suggest that syntactic
constraints, e.g., island constraints, are active in the ellipsis site (Hardt 1993, 1999 and
Kennedy 2003); if VP Ellipsis were analyzed as a variable – and thus with no internal
syntactic structure – it would be expected not to be sensitive to such constraints. I will
review data suggesting that syntactic constraints are active within the ellipsis site in Section 4.2.1.
Evidence for the pro-form account of VP Ellipsis comes from examples that appear to be instances of sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis. If sloppy readings are best analyzed as bound variables, these examples potentially provide good support for treating
them as variables. I will review these data, and accounts that have been proposed to account for them, in Section 4.2.2.

4.2.1 Structural Constraints That Hold within the Ellipsis Site
At least two types of syntactic constraints have been observed to hold within elided VPs:
(i) island constraints and (ii) binding theory constraints; I will review each in turn.75

4.2.1.1 Island Constraints
Wh-movement is possible out of an ellipsis site, as the examples in (284) show (based on
Chao 1987, Tancredi 1992, Hardt 1993, Schwarz 2000, Johnson 2001, Kennedy 2003).

75

Kennedy (2003) argues that the picture is a little more complicated than this. Building on previous work
of his with Jason Merchant (Kennedy and Merchant 2000), he shows that structural constraints that make
reference to the interface between the syntax and phonological component do not hold within an ellipsis
site, although they may hold for a pronounced VP. See references for further details.
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(284) a. I know who1 Mary likes t1 and who2 Kim doesn’t Ø.
b. The problems wh1 you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2 you
can’t Ø.
c. Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, wh2 I don’t Ø.

Strikingly, this movement is subject to island constraints, as the examples in (285) show
(Haik 1987): each of these examples contrasts with those in (284) in that in them, the whphrase moves out of a restrictive relative clause island.76

(285) a. *I know who1 Mary likes t1 and who2 Bill wrote a whole song that he does Ø.
b. *The problems wh1 that you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2
you wrote an article that explained Ø.
c. *Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, I never made a pie that had Ø.

The ungrammaticality of the examples in (285) is expected if elided VPs have internal
syntactic structure, and thus behave just like an overt VP, assuming that island constraints
are defined over structural configurations (and not, e.g., semantically).77 Further support

76

Sensitivity to island constraints sets VP ellipsis apart from sluicing, which is not sensitive to islands
(Chomsky 1972, Lakoff 1972, Baker and Brame 1972, Chung, Ladusaw, and McCloskey 1995, Lasnik
2001, Merchant 2001), as the following examples show (from Merchant 2001):
(i)

a. They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don’t remember which __.
b. *I don’t remember which Balkan language they want to hire someone who speaks __.

I do not, however, see this as affecting the argument that VP ellipsis involves internal syntactic structure
(see, e.g., Merchant 2001 for an account of the difference in behavior between VP ellipsis and sluicing).
77

Jacobson (1992) and Hardt (1993) (the latter citing Lappin and McCord 1990), however, analyze examples like (284), in which a wh-phrase has moved out of the VP ellipsis site, as instances of pseudo-gapping.
Under that account, these examples would be predicted to obey island constraints. See, however, Haik
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for the conclusion that elided VPs are fully articulated syntactically comes from the behavior of the expressions do so, do it, and do that, which do not permit wh-binding, as the
examples in (286) show (based on Johnson 2001).

(286) a. *I know who1 Mary kissed t1 and who2 Kim didn’t do so/do it/do that.
b. *The problems wh1 that you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2
that you can’t do so/do it/do that.
c. *Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, wh2 I don’t do so/do it/do that.

This is expected if these expressions are just the combination of main verb do and a proform (see Section 2.5), and thus do not support wh-movement.
To summarize this section, the contrast between (286) on the one hand, and (284)
and (285) on the other, follows if VP Ellipsis has the internal structure of a garden-variety
VP, while do so and do it do not.

4.2.1.2 Binding Theory Constraints
Assuming that Binding Theory constraints are evaluated over structural configurations
(but cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1993, as discussed below), sensitivity to these constraints
has also been used as evidence of syntactic structure. For example, the ill-formedness of
(287a) suggests that Principle B is active within an elided VP (from Kennedy 2003): 78

(1997), Kennedy (1997, Tomioka (2001, and Johnson (2001) who present empirical problems for pseudogapping analysis of these examples.
78

Some speakers of English find (287) acceptable, in which case this argument would not hold.
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(287) a. ??Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t Ø.
b. Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t take care of him1.

The ill-formedness of (287) can be accounted for if the ellipsis is syntactically articulated
at LF, and if Principle B is assumed to be a structural constraint that holds at LF, as
(287b) shows. Further, minimal pairs with do so, do it, and do that instead of VP Ellipsis
are grammatical, which is again expected if these expressions are just the combination of
do and a pro-form:

(288) Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t do it/do so.

That (288) contrasts with (287a) would be expected on the deletion view of ellipsis, since
do it and do so would not incur violations of Principle B.
It should be noted, however, that Hardt (1997) – defending a pro-form account of
VP Ellipsis – accounts for the ill-formedness of (287a) by assuming that Principle B is a
semantic – and not a syntactic – constraint, following Reinhart and Reuland (1993). That
is, assuming that predicates with two co-indexed arguments must be reflexive-marked,
the examples in (288) would be bad because the predicate in VP Ellipsis is not reflexive
marked.

4.2.2 Sloppy VP Ellipsis
The previous two sections provide positive evidence for the deletion account of ellipsis.
In particular, the observation that wh-extraction out of VP ellipses is sensitive to island
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constraints provides strong evidence for this account, assuming that there is good reason
to take island constraints to be syntactic. There are, however, also certain examples that
have been posited as problematic for this view of ellipsis, which have been argued to
support the pro-form account of ellipsis. These are examples of what appear to be sloppy
readings of VP Ellipsis, illustrated in (289) and (290) (from Hardt 1997 and Schwarz
2000; see also Sauerland 2004, Elbourne 2005, and Tomioka, to appear, for discussion of
these examples):

(289) I’ll help you if you want me to Ø. I’ll kiss you even if you don’t Ø.
(Hardt 1997, (16), attributed to Gawron/Pollard, p.c.)

(290) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t
Ø, either.

(Schwarz 2000)

In (289), the elided VP may be interpreted as “want me to kiss you”, and in (290), the
elided VP may be interpreted as “want to clean”. Both Schwarz and Hardt liken these examples to sloppy readings of pronouns in ellipsis sites. Importantly, sloppy readings of
pronouns have been accounted for by analyzing the pronouns as bound variables (Keenan
1971, Sag 1976, Williams 1977, Reinhart 1976, Lasnik 1976), and Schwarz extends this
analysis to the sloppy VPs in (289) and (290), with the result that his account crucially
makes use of variables over VP meanings (that is, higher-type variables). To make clear
the account, let me review at this point analysis of sloppy readings of NPs (the more clas-

143

sic cases) as bound variables. Consider, for example, (287), which is ambiguous between
a sloppy reading, and a strict reading.

(291) John loves his mother and Bill does too.

On one reading, (291) is true iff John loves his (own) mother, and Bill also loves John’s
mother; this is the so-called strict reading. On a second reading, (291) is true iff John is in
his (own) office, and Bill is in his (own) office; this is the so-called sloppy reading. The
ambiguity has been analyzed as an ambiguity between referential and bound (see references above). The strict reading, for example, can be represented by the LF in (292), in
which the pronoun his in the elided VP co-refers with John.

(292) John1 loves his1 mother and Bill2 does love his1 mother too.

The sloppy reading, in contrast, can be accounted for by treating the pronouns in both
VPs as bound variables, as in (296).79

(296) John [⇧x . x is in x’s office] and Bill [⇧x . x is in x’s office]

79

Hardt actually argues against the analysis of sloppy readings as cases of bound variables, and instead
analyzes them in a different framework as shifts in the discourse center: A sloppy pronoun can shift its
interpretation because it refers to the discourse center, the most prominent entity currently under discussion. See further discussion on this below.
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Schwarz extends this analysis to the VP cases, by treating the sloppy VP as a bound variable. He assigns to (290), for example, the LF in (294), in which the sloppy VP is analyzed as a variable bound by an overt VP that fronts at LF.

(293) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t
Ø, either.

(Schwarz 2000)

(294) [VP cook]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1]
[VP clean]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1]

By Schwarz’s account, then, sloppy VPs are instances of bound VPs, and thus provide an
argument for the pro-form (or variable) account of ellipsis.
There are, however, several problems for this analysis (as observed in, e.g.,
Schwarz 2000, Hardt 2003, Sauerland 2004, Elbourne 2005, and in particular Tomioka,
to appear). For one, sloppy VPs may have wh-traces inside them, as (296) illustrates
(Schwarz 2000, Sauerland 2004, Tomioka, to appear):80

(296) A: Why are you so upset with Fred? He bought the books wh1 that he was
supposed to t1, right?
B: Yeah, but then he READ the books wh1 that he WASN’T supposed to read t1.
(Tomioka, to appear)

80

See Tomioka (to appear) for discussion of how (296) controls for certain problems with Schwarz’s original examples of this sort.
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This makes the pro-form analysis of these cases look puzzling, as wh-movement out of
ellipsis sites can be taken as evidence against the variable account of ellipsis (and in particular, that such movement is sensitive to island constraints).
A second problem for this account is illustrated by (298), which shows that proforms like do so or do it do not permit sloppy readings:

(296) When John had to cook, he didn’t try to. When he had to clean, he didn’t do it
either.

(based on Hardt 1999, Schwarz 2000)

If VP ellipses are analyzed as pro-forms, then it is unexplained why overt pro-forms like
do it and do so do not permit sloppy readings.
A final problem is noted by both Schwarz and Hardt: If the sloppy VP is construed as a bound variable, we expect there to be a binder in the antecedent VP (which
then appears in the elided VP). In order to get the right configuration for this, Schwarz,
for example, QRs the embedded VPs, so that (295) is associated with the LF in (296).

(295) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t
Ø, either.

(Schwarz 2000)

(296) [VP cook]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1]
[VP clean]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1]
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As both Schwarz and Hardt observe, the problem with this analysis is that QR should not
be possible out of an island. For example, when the universal everyone is embedded in a
when-clause, as in (297), it may not bind the pronoun he; this can be explained by a restriction on QR as being clause-bound.

(297) When everyone left, he said goodbye.

Interestingly, Schwarz and Hardt point out that this a problem for all sloppy readings, not
just those cases of sloppy VPs: Sloppy readings of NPs are also possible even when they
are not bound in the antecedent VP (also observed in Westcoat 1989, Rooth 1992, Tomioka 1997). Consider, for example, (298), in which the antecedent NP for the first instance
of her occurs in an island (example based on Schwarz 2000); as (299) shows, in order to
analyze the sloppy reading of the ellipsis as containing a bound variable, the antecedents
must QR out of when-clauses.

(298) When Karen wins, we congratulate her. When Sarah wins, we do, too.

(299) Karen1 ⇧1 [when t1 wins, we congratulate her1]
Sarah1 ⇧1 [when t1 wins, we congratulate her1]

Given these problems with the bound variable approach to these examples, several alternative analyses of sloppy readings have appeared. Hardt (1993, 1999, 2003), for
example, concludes that sloppy readings should not be treated as involving bound vari-
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ables, and proposes a fundamentally different analysis, according to which sloppy readings instead involve shifts in the discourse center. I will not go into the specifics of
Hardt’s account here, except to say that although the analysis does not analyze sloppy
VPs as bound variables, it does crucially treat them as variables. Tomioka (1999), in contrast, argues that problematic cases of sloppy identity involve E-Type pronouns – implicit
definite descriptions. Schwarz notes that an analysis along these lines might be implemented for the VP cases. See also Elbourne (2005) and Tomioka (to appear) for further
alternatives, the latter making use of higher-type variables, the former not.
I will conclude here that the best analysis for these examples remains an open issue, and thus until a stronger account of them can be proposed, it is unclear whether they
do or not provide strong evidence against NHTV.

4.2.4 Summary
To summarize this section, I have tried to show that there is ample independent support
for treating VP Ellipsis as having fully articulated internal syntactic structure at LF, and
thus does not make use of higher-type variables. I have also tried to make clear potential
problems that come along with adopting this view of ellipsis, in particular, it is presently
unclear whether sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis are a challenge to the deletion account of
ellipsis, given that there are presently multiple competing accounts of these examples,
including Elbourne (2005), which does not make use of higher-type variables.
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4.3 NP Ellipsis
NP Ellipsis is illustrated in the following examples, in which an NP following a possessive determiner – his in is the (a) example and Max’s in the (b) example – is absent
(based on Jackendoff 1968, 1971, Perlmutter 1970):

(300) a. My shirt is the same as his Ø.
b. Bill’s story may be amazing, but Max’s Ø is virtually incredible.

Following Elbourne (2002), I will assume that NP Ellipsis may follow almost any determiner, as the paradigm in (301) shows (examples based on Elbourne 2002); I assume that
the determiners a, possessives such as my, or no alternate as one, mine, and none, respectively, when followed by NP Ellipsis, as (e) – (g) illustrate (Perlmutter 1970, Stockwell,
Schachter and Partee 1973, Elbourne 2002). Only two determiners may not precede an
elided NP, namely, the and every, as (h) and (i) show (however, as discussed in Section
4.5, Elbourne takes the to surface as it before an elided NP, as suggested in Postal 1966.)

(301) a. I’ll wash these dishes, if you wash those Ø .
a. Sue bought two books, and Mary bought three Ø.
b. Most people bother Joe, but he does like some/a few Ø.
c. The boys came to the party; each/both/neither Ø brought presents.
d. Many went south; few/most/all Ø returned.
e. Your kids are taller than mine/*my Ø.
f. Two heads are better than none/*no Ø.
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g. I wanted to read a book, so I bought one/*a Ø.
h. *Sue only bought one book, but Mary bought every Ø.
i. *I wanted to read the best book in the store, so I bought the Ø.

Less attention has been devoted in the literature to the interpretation of NP Ellipsis than
to that of VP Ellipsis, but here too, the issue arises whether the elided constituent is best
analyzed as fully articulated at LF, or rather, as a variable over NP meanings, that is, a
higher-type variable, assuming NPs denote properties of individuals. In the following
sections, I will look at whether there is evidence favoring one account over the other by
(i) trying to determine whether syntactic constraints hold within the ellipsis site, and (ii)
looking at potential cases of sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis. Again, I will try to make
clear the consequences – both good and bad – of adopting a deletion account of ellipsis,
as this is the account that NHTV supports.

4.3.1 Structural Constraints That Hold within NP Ellipsis
As with VP Ellipsis, we can ask whether there is any evidence of internal structure in NP
Ellipsis by observing whether syntactic constraints are active within the ellipsis site. One
way of testing this is to check whether wh-movement is possible out of NP Ellipsis, and
further, whether this movement obeys island constraints. Testing this, however, is made
difficult by the fact that many examples in which wh-phrases move out of a DP are degraded. For example, movement out of a DP with a strong determiner (e.g., a possessive)
is judged worse than movement out of a DP with a weak determiner, as the following
contrast illustrates:
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(302) a. ?Who does Mary want a picture of t1?
b. ??Who does Mary like her pictures of t1?

Trying to control for this factor, the examples in (303) suggest that wh-movement out of
an elided NP is judged ungrammatical.81 In (303a), for example, who has moved out of
the elided NP, picture of t2, resulting in ungrammaticality. Compare the improved (303b),
in which the same NP is not elided, as well as (303c), in which the head noun is elided
(gapped), but the PP out of which who moves crucially is not (recall that a alternatives
with one when followed by an elided N or NP).

(303) a. *I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS one
picture of t2.
b. ?I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS a
picture of t2.
c. I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS one
picture of t2.

These examples suggest that wh-movement is not possible out of an elided NP, and thus
potentially provide evidence against the deletion account of ellipsis. However, given the
awkwardness of the non-elided versions of these examples (as in (303b), for example),
these examples perhaps should not be taken to have too much bearing on issue of how

81

Chisholm (2003) claims that whether movement is possible out of an elided NP cannot be tested, because
he argues that NP ellipsis is only possible in DPs that have a possessive determiner. I am unconvinced,
however, by his arguments for that position, which are largely based on whether or not NP ellipsis may be
pragmatically controlled. See Chisholm (2003) for further details.
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best to analyze NP Ellipsis. Moreover, puzzlingly, unlike a wh-operator, a quantifier can
bind into a deleted NP, as the example in (304a) show.

(304) a. Each prisoner1 suspected that that Al Jazeera would publish most pictures
of him1, but that CNN would only publish a few pictures of him1.
b. *Each prisoner1 suspected that that Al Jazeera would publish most pictures of
him1, but that CNN would only publish a few pictures of him1.
As (304b) shows, binding is not possible when the pronoun is overt. I do not at this time
know what to make of this data, except to conclude that when and why binding into the
ellipsis site is possible or not is unresolved.

4.3.2 Sloppy NP Ellipsis
As with VP Ellipsis, sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis are possible (Elbourne 2005), as
(305) shows.

(305) When Bill wanted some advice, I gave him some. When he wanted some money,
I didn’t give him some money.

The same problems that arose for analyzing sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis as bound variables over VP meanings, however, also hold for analyzing sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis
as bound variables over NP meanings. In particular, in order to create a binder for the
bound variable (over NP meanings) in the elided VP, the NP might be QR-ed as (306)
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shows; this however, violates the clause-bound restriction on QR, as the NP is fronted out
of a when-clause.

(306) [NP advice]1 ⇧1 [when Bill wanted some t1, I gave him some ∆1]
[NP money]1 ⇧1 [when Bill wanted some t1, I didn’t give him some ∆1]

Here too, I will conclude that it is presently unclear whether sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis are a challenge to the deletion account of ellipsis, given that there are competing
analyses of these examples, and in particular that the analysis of Elbourne (2005) does
make use of higher-type variables, but rather assigns to these cases fully articulated syntactic structure at LF.

4.4 One(s)-Anaphora
One, as used in (307), has previously been analyzed as an NP pro-form (Ross 1967, Jackendoff 1977, Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981, Stockwell, Schachter and Partee 1973,
among others). The analysis is based on two observations, both illustrated in (307): (i)
one appears to have the distribution of an NP – occurring in a position following a determiner and adjective – and (ii) semantically it seems to pick up the reference of a preceding NP.

(307) I’ll wash the big dishes if you wash the little ones.
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Llombart-Huesca (2002), however, presents several arguments against analyzing one in
this way. She proposes instead that one is phonological support (in the sense of dosupport) of a number affix that is stranded as a Num head in certain cases of NP Ellipsis,
when an empty Num head cannot be licensed. In the following section, I will review
Llombart-Huesca’s arguments against the pro-form account of one, and the basic aspects
of her account.

4.4.1 One as Num
Llombart-Huesca (henceforth, LH) presents several problems for an analysis of one as an
NP pro-form. First, one(s)-anaphora cannot pick up the reference a mass noun, as the following examples show (Jackendoff 1971):

(308) a. *John had some chocolate cake, and Mary had some vanilla one(s).
b. *He drank a lot of beer, but I didn’t drink much one(s).

If one is simply a variable over properties, it is unclear why it should be restricted to
count nouns only. Note that NP Ellipsis, in contrast, is not subject to this constraint
(Jackendoff 1971):

(309) a. John had some cake, and Mary had some Ø, too.
b. He drank a lot of beer, but I didn’t drink much Ø.
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Second, one may not simply appear wherever an NP may; it may not, for example, occur
following a quantificational determiner unless an adjective follows the determiner, as
(310a-b) show.

(310) a. *Jack bought a few cupcakes. I bought several ones too.
b. Jack bought a few yellow cupcakes. I bought several pink ones.

Again, if one is simply an NP pro-form, it is unclear why it should not appear exactly
where an NP may. The situation is similar for the definite determiner: one may not occur
with the definite determiner the unless a restrictive modifier – e.g., an AP or PP – also
occurs, as the following contrasts show:

(311) a. *Ella likes the car and I like the one, too.
b. Ella likes the blue car and I like the pink one.

(312) a. *Ella likes the car near the door and I like the one too.
b. Ella likes the car near the door and I like the one near the deck.

If one was an NP pro-form, it would be need to be explained why it does not occur in
environments like *the one.
LH proposes to account for these observations by analyzing one not as an NP proform, but as phonological support for a morphological number affix that occupies the
Num position, in the same way that do provides phonological support for a tense affix in
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I, when I is not adjacent to V. By LH’s account, one(s)-anaphora is an instance of NP Ellipsis, so that, for example, the pink one in (313a) would correspond to the LF in (313b)
(I assume that AP left adoins NumP):

(313) a. I like the green toothbrush better than the pink one.
b.

DP
qp
D
NumP
g
qp
the
AP
NumP
g
qp
pink
Num
NP
g
g
one
toothbrush

LH motivates her analysis from a number of perspectives, which I will review here in
turn. First, she provides some support for this syntax from Italian. Italian has a process
like English one(s)-anaphora, by which uno/-a (‘one’) appears to substitute for a previously mentioned NP, so that (314b) can be used to mean the same as (314a), in a context
in which auto is previously mentioned (data from LH, based on Rizzi 1990):
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(314) a. un’auto enorme sarebbe meglio.
an/one enormous car would-be better
b. una enorme sarebbe meglio
an/one enormous would-be better
c. *un’enorme sarebbe meglio
an/one enormous would-be better
d. un’altra sarebbe meglio
an/one enormous would-be better

Interestingly, phonological reduction of una can occur in (314a), but not in (314b), as
(314c) shows. LH points out that this can be explained if it is assumed that auto is elided
in (b), thereby blocking una from reducing due to a following vowel-initial word. Further
support for this analysis comes from (314d), where una is followed by a vowel initial
pre-nominal adjective, and phonological reduction is in this case possible; this can be explained assuming that reduction is not blocked in this case, because the ellipsis follows
the adjective.
Second, she proposes that one does the semantic work of a Num head, which she
identifies as having the semantics of a classifier. Spelling this out along the lines of
Krifka (1995) and Kratzer (2005), Num (and in effect, one) here could be construed as a
function from kinds to the properties of individuals that exemplify them (thus, one here is
taken as doing the semantic work of Kratzer’s null classifier):

(315) ||[Num one]|| = ⇧x . [⇧y . x ≤ y]
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(316) ||toothbrush|| = TOOTHBRUSHk
(317) ||one toothbrush|| = ⇧x . x ≤ TOOTHBRUSHk

This, she proposes, accounts for the count noun restriction on one: because one has the
semantics of number morphology – which is only compatible with count nouns – it necessarily results in a non-mass interpretation.
Finally, LH motivates the construal of one(s)-anaphora as an instance of NP Ellipsis by showing that the two constructions are largely in complementary distribution,
with one surfacing in just those cases that Num would otherwise be stranded. Specifically, Num, she proposes, is stranded when two conditions hold: (i) it cannot merge with
N because the N has elided (as in the case of NP Ellipsis) – this is similar to tense morphology in I, which cannot merge with V when V has elided (as in the cases of VP Ellipsis) (Halle and Marantz 1993, Bobaljik 1994, Lasnik 1995), and (ii) it is not licensed by a
determiner with strong features. Following Lobeck (1995), LH assumes that certain determiners have strong features and as a consequence may license an empty Num head;
determiners that have strong features are possessive Ds (e.g., mine), quantificational determiners (e.g., most) and plural demonstratives (these, those).82 Determiners that do not
have strong features are the, every, and this. Further, she proposes that the element holding the strong agreement feature must immediately c-command the empty Num in order
to license it. To illustrate her analysis, consider the following three structures, in which
the null Num head is licensed by a determiner with strong features: a possessive deter-

82

LH’s analysis is a departure from Lobeck’s however, in that LH assumes that only functional heads must
be liscensed. That is, for LH, empty lexical heads need not be licensed, as is the case for Lobeck.
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miner in (318), a plural demonstrative determiner in (318), and a quantificational determiner in (319).83

(318) a. Some birds flew south, but many birds stayed behind.
b. [DP many [NumP [Num [+pl] ] [NP birds]]]

(319) a. I like these phones, but not those phones.
b. [DP those [NumP [Num [+pl] ] [NP phones]]]

(320) a. Your kids are shorter than mine kids.
b. [DP mine [NumP [Num [+poss] ] [NP kids]]]

For the three above cases of NP Ellipsis, the empty Num is licensed, and one-support is
not required. In contrast, there are two main cases in which an empty Num would not be
licensed, and one surfaces. First, adjectives block a strong determiner from licensing
Num, which explains the need for one to surface in (321).

83

LH’s syntactic trees are slightly different than those above, in that she assumes that quantificational determiners occur as heads of QP, and possessive determiners occur in the specifier of DP. The simplifications I have made above do not affect her arguments presented here.
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(321) a. I like some green toothbrushes, and most pink ones toothbrushes.
b.

DP
qp
D
NumP
g
qp
most
AP
NumP
g
qp
pink
Num
NP
g
g
ones
toothbrush

Second, determiners that do not bear strong features, such as the singular demonstrative
or the definite determiner must occur with one:84

84

It is unclear, by LH’s analysis, why *the one is ungrammatical, given that the does not bear strong features. The absence of *the one could, however, be account for by assuming that the followed by NP ellipsis
is phonologically realized as the pronoun it (as proposed in Elbourne 2002, based on Postal 1966.)
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(322) a. I like the car over there, but I don’t like the one by the counter.
b.

DP
qp
D
NumP
g
qp
the
NumP
PP
ei
6
Num
NP
by the counter
g
g
one
car

In (322), the does not bear strong agreement, and thus may not license the number affix
in Num.
Although one(s)-anaphora are largely in complementary distribution, there are
some environments in which some speakers permit both one and NP Ellipsis to occur. In
particular, some speakers permit both following the singular and plural demonstrative
determiners, as illustrated in (323) and (324) ((323b), in particular, is prescriptively bad).

(323) a. I like these glasses but I don’t like those.
b. ?I like these glasses but I don’t like those ones.

(324) a. ?I like this hat and you like that.

(Johnson 2005)

b. I like this hat and you like that one.

LH suggests for the plural cases that there some dialectal parameterization regarding
which determiners are specified with strong features (and thus can license an empty Num
head).
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If NP Ellipsis and one(s)-anaphora both are instances of NP Ellipsis, then we
should expect them to behave identically with respect to some of the diagnostics for syntactic structure internal to the elided site. This seems to be borne out, as shown in the following sections. Like NP Ellipsis, wh-movement is not possible out of one(s)-anaphora,
as (325a) shows, although quantificational binding into one(s)-anaphora is possible, as
(325b) shows.

(325) a. I know who1 Sarah has a good picture of t1, and who2 Ralph has a bad one __
*(?of).
b. Each prisoner1 hopes that Mary3 will publish her good pictures of him1, and
that she’ll burn her bad ones __.

Similarly, as with NP Ellipsis, sloppy readings do seem to be possible for one(s)anaphora, although the examples are more complicated to construct with one. For example, the elided VP in (326) below perhaps may be interpreted as meaning “want a big
kiss”.

(326) When she wants a hug, I give her a big one. When she wants a kiss, I don’t.

The same problem, however, arises for deriving sloppy readings of one here, if such readings are derived by treating one as a bound variable: in order to create a binder for one, a
kiss would have to QR out of a when-clause in order to bind a variable in the elided VP.
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To sum up, LH presents arguments against treating one as a NP pro-form, and instead for treating is as phonological support for stranded number morphology in a Num
head. Any theory that posits one as a pro-from must explain why it does not have the
same distribution as an ordinary NP, and why it is (largely) in complementary distribution with NP Ellipsis. LH’s explains the restriction that one can only pick up the reference of count nouns, as the result of one having the semantics of number morphology,
which only is compatible with count nouns, in the same way that only count nouns – and
not mass nouns – may be pluralized (see, e.g., Chierchia 1998 and references therein).
If LH’s arguments go through, and one-anaphora is an instance of NP Ellipsis,
and if, in turn, if the interpretation of NP Ellipsis does not involve variables, then oneanaphora does not provide a counterexample to NHTV.

4.5 E-Type Pronouns as NP Ellipsis
In the context of NP Ellipsis, it is worth observing that Elbourne (2002) argues that etype pronouns – which have previously been analyzed as involving a covert property
variable – should be construed as instances of NP Ellipsis. In this section, I will briefly
review the motivation for his account.
The problem of e-type pronouns is illustrated in (327); these pronouns sometimes
display co-varying readings without being c-commanded by any obvious potential binder.

(327) Every man who owns a donkey hugs it.
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One solution to this problem is to treat the pronoun like a disguised definite description,
as in (328) (Evans 1977, Cooper 1979).

(328) Every man who owns a donkey hugs [the donkey he owns].

The account has been implemented by treating the descriptive content of the definite description as provided by a free variable over relations, that is, a higher-type variable
(Cooper 1979). For example, in the version of the account in Heim and Kratzer (1998), in
which e-type pronouns are represented at LF as in (329).

(329) [the [R<i,<e,et>> pro<j,e>]]

Assuming that (329) corresponds to the pronoun it in (327), the relation variable R would
pick up the salient donkey-owned-by relation, and the individual variable pro would be
bound by the subject, every man. In effect, (327) would be true iff if every individual x
such that x is a man who owns a donkey beats the donkey owned by x. Elbourne proposes
instead that e-type pronouns are actually definite articles whose complements are subject
to NP-deletion, as in (330a). Building on Postal (1966), he assumes that when the is followed by NP Ellipsis, it is pronounced as it, so that (330a) is pronounced as (330b).

(330) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey he owns.
b. Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
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Elbourne supports his analysis of e-type pronouns as instances of NP Ellipsis by showing
that the descriptive content of an e-type pronoun behaves like elided material. For example, NP Ellipsis is not possible in examples like (331b), in which hers would mean her
guitar, the elided NP (i.e., guitar) being inferred from the meaning of the preceding sentence, Mary is a guitarist.85

(331) a. Mary has a guitar. She should bring hers.
b. Mary is a guitarist. *She should bring hers.

Elbourne refers to such cases as ‘inferable antecedents’. E-type pronouns are subject to
the same restriction, as the contrast in (332) shows (Elbourne 2002, based on Heim 1982,
1990).

(332) a. Someone who has a guitar should bring it.
b. *Some guitarist should bring it.

If all that was required to recover the descriptive content of an e-type pronoun was a salient property, the relation married to should be made salient in (332b). This data thus supports the construal of e-type pronouns as instances of NP Ellipsis.86

85

However, it is possible for NP Ellipsis to be pragmatically controlled, that is, it does not require a linguistic antecedent (I follow Elbourne in disputing the judgments of Lasnik and Saito 1992, who claim that
NP Ellipsis cannot be pragmatically controlled.) For example, in a context in which someone reaches for a
pair of gloves on the table which happen to be Sue’s, it is acceptable to say “No, those are Sue’s!”, without
having mentioned “Sue’s gloves”, as long as they are contextually salient.
86

Note that one(s)-anaphora behaves the same way, that is, it does not permit inferable antecedents either:

(i)

a.

Mary has a guitar. She should bring that one.
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4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have adopted analyses of VP and NP ellipses according to which they
have internal syntactic structure just like that of an over VP or NP at LF, and thus are
consistent with NHTV. I have reviewed arguments that have been presented in support of
this view of ellipsis, as well as certain examples that may be problematic for this view. I
have also adopted the analysis of one(s)-anaphora according to which it is an instance of
NP Ellipsis, following Llombart-Huesca (2002), and thus does not pose a counterexample to NHTV.

b.

Mary is a guitarist. *She should bring that one.

This is further support for treating one(s)-anaphora as a case of NP Ellipsis.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

In this brief chapter, I would like to summarize the thesis proposed and also outline some
paths for future research.
The main claim of this thesis is that variables in the LF representations of natural
languages range only over individuals. While this makes very restrictive predictions
about the inventory of constructions that involve variables, these restrictions seem to hold
for the cases I have looked at, namely, the pro-forms such, adverbial so (and thus), do so,
predicative so, and A’-constructions such as topicalization and wh-movement.
Put in a broader context, I see this thesis as bringing together three lines of research: (i) investigating the syntax-semantics of non-nominal anaphora; (ii) exploring potentially universal semantic constraints on possible variables; and (iii) studying the syntax-semantics of morphology that involves reference to kinds, and its parallels to morphology that involves reference to degrees (as in Bolinger 1972).
There are several paths that one might take from here, to pursue this research further, which I will outline in the following three paragraphs.
First, I have motivated this constraint based primarily on data from English, German, and Polish, and one would certainly want to test the cross-linguistic validity of the
constraint as a potential semantic universal. In particular, one would want to look at types
of non-nominal clitics (in, e.g., the Romance languages), as well as possible non-nominal
resumptives (in, e.g., Hebrew). If higher-type pro-forms are possible, we might expect
both of these types of expressions to occur.
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Second, I have not looked in this work at propositional pro-forms such as that in
She knows that. I see no immediate problem in viewing such pro-forms as ranging over
individuals that correspond to propositions. However, further investigation of these proforms remains an area for future research.
Finally, the similarities in syntax and semantics between such (and its related
forms) and degree morphology (such as how and degree so) raises the broader question of
why, in English and across languages, expressions that make reference to kinds and degrees seem to share morphology, e.g., such, so, as, and how (as pointed out in Bolinger
1972). This sets as a direction for future research further investigation of the theoretical
and cross-linguistic links between kind and degree morphology.
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